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ABSTRACT
The role of conspiracy theories as a political force has recently attracted the
attention of scholars and commentators, but little work exists on the ways in
which the internet affects these unique sociopolitical phenomena. Especially
noteworthy is the fact that these theories’ proponents are not even remotely bound
to rational responses to real-world events, making them political forces that are
uniquely difficult to predict and understand. The uncanny case of QAnon, a nowinfamous pro-Trump conspiracy theory that developed for years on internet
messageboards before manifesting in the January 6th 2021 assault on the US
Capitol, has the potential to illuminate important aspects of this relationship. This
is for three main reasons: 1) the theory is based almost entirely online, 2) it has
had undeniable real-world political effects, and 3) QAnon’s most important realworld impacts took place after the theory’s explicit disconfirmation by the
electoral defeat of its protagonist. In order to gain insight into the ways in which
QAnon’s near-exclusive basis on the internet has affected its post-‘disproval’
trajectory, this research will conduct a longitudinal thematic discourse analysis of
posts from 8chan’s /qresearch board, a key locus of QAnon activity. It will then
compare the changing characteristics and trajectory of QAnon to the post‘disproval’ histories of older conspiracy theories in order to discern the internet’s
effects on conspiracy theories’ post-‘disproval’ trajectories.
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INTRODUCTION
The January 6th storming of the US Capitol by thousands of then-President Trump’s
supporters shocked the world, and profoundly shook many Americans’ sense of security
and faith in the liberal norms and institutions that they associate with the promise of
America, and of western liberal democracy more broadly. Indeed, the widely shared
images of the besieged Capitol provided an almost heavy-handed symbol of the political
climate that, though growing for decades, has manifested itself most obviously in Donald
Trump’s singular presidency.
Though the crowd on January 6th was comprised of a wide range of pro-Trump
Americans, it was largely conceived of and led by a hard core of committed Trump
supporters, many of whom are associated with QAnon, a strange pro-Trump conspiracy
theory (Reuters, 2021; Rubin, Bruggeman, and Steakin, 2021). According to proponents
of this now-infamous theory, Donald Trump’s ascension to the presidency was no mere
fluke, but rather the culmination of a decades-long plot by Trump, JFK Jr. (who is not
dead), a group of patriotic ‘white hat’ generals, and others (Sommer, 2019). This plot was
undertaken by these brave protectors of American values in order to bring to light the fact
that American (and global) politics have, for some time, been controlled by a sinister
cabal populated with figures from the Democratic and Republican Party establishments
and cultural elites (read: Jews/Satanists/interdimensional lizardmen, or some combination
thereof). The culmination of this theory, known among Q-believers as ‘The Storm,’
predicts a military coup by Trump-aligned forces who violently dismantle the cabal and
restore America to its rightful place in the world.
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The staggering real-world effects of QAnon, coupled with its bizarre, nonsensical,
and often distressing nature, drew attention to an oft-overlooked aspect of American
politics- conspiracy theories. Indeed, such theories are nothing new, and have been a
meaningful force in American politics since the country’s inception- from the AntiMasonic Party of the late 1700s to the 9/11 truthers of the early aughts, conspiracy
theories have continually occupied a significant space in American political life. Yet
these theories and their adherents are emphatically not bound by the paradigmatic ideas
of rationality and self-interest that have dominated the political science discourse for
decades, and as a result are understudied and often misunderstood.
For a prime example of this irrationality, consider that the events of January 6 th
came after the theory was faced with a massive and seemingly inescapable contradiction
in Trump’s electoral defeat (a development which would clearly impede The Storm from
taking place). This apparent intensification in support and uptick in theory-related activity
after disconfirmation seems to align with Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s longdominant and widely-known theory of cognitive dissonance avoidance among
conspiratorially-minded group members, as originally laid out in their seminal 1956 study
When Prophecy Fails. Though it is generally accepted in the more recent scholarship that
such a post-‘disproval’ renaissance is not the only possible path for a conspiracy theory to
follow after disconfirmation, depending on various contextual factors such an outcome is
a definite possibility.
Regrettably though, little work exists on the role that one major intervening factor,
the mode of communication used by a theories’ proponents, might have on conspiracy
theories’ post-‘disproval’ prospects. QAnon, with its near-exclusive basis online, presents
2

an intriguing and particularly useful case for research. Beyond shedding light on QAnon
itself, an examination of this timely case is sure to yield insights into the effects the
internet has on conspiracy theories’ content, structure, and style, as well as on their post‘disproval’ trajectories. By investigating the case of QAnon this research aims to gain
greater insight into these fascinating topics, and seeks to answer the question: How has
QAnon’s structure, style, and content evolved in the face of increasing ‘disproval,’ and
what does QAnon’s post-‘disproval’ trajectory tell us about the internet’s effects on
conspiracy theories and their communities?
In order to pursue this line of inquiry, the dissertation will proceed as follows: First,
the introduction will conclude with a few necessary remarks on certain vocabulary used
throughout my research. The next section will provide an overview of the existing
literature on the topics of conspiracy theories and the internet’s effects on them, as well
as on cognitive dissonance in the context of conspiratorial thinking. The methodology
section will outline the basic contours of my chosen model of discourse analysis-based
research, highlighting my data selection methods and analytical framework and
addressing certain difficulties I encountered in developing my analysis. In order to
present my research in a succinct and coherent manner, my findings and analysis will be
presented in a sequence of subsections. First, I develop a brief profile of each of the
themes identified in my discourse analysis, highlighting their meaning and relevance in
part through the use of illustrative example posts. Then, with the aid of tabular and
graphic presentations of my data, I present a longitudinal findings section that accounts
for the dataset as a whole and identifies key trends and correlations therein. Finally, I
discuss my interpretation of these findings as they relate to QAnon’s trajectory in the
3

period between November 2020 and January 2021, and analyze it with reference to the
internet’s effects on the theory’s evolving nature. The conclusion will restate my
findings, note certain limitations to the research, and once again emphasize the
importance of studying the internet’s effects on conspiracy theories and of treating these
communities as a political force.
Disclaimers
For clarity’s sake, two important caveats must be made before proceeding any
further. The first has to do with the language I have chosen to use with regards to QAnon
and other conspiracy theories’ disconfirmation by real-world events. This dissertation
uses the words “disproval” and “post-disproval” to convey this dynamic, but it is
apparent (and indeed, central to my analysis) that in the minds of many Q-believers, the
events of the 2020 election have not actually disproved anything. For this reason, and in
order to highlight the incongruity of conspiratorial thinking with reality that is of interest
here, I have enclosed these terms in single quotation marks (ex. ‘disproval’ and post‘disproval’).
Secondly, it is important to clearly state the distinction between the phrase
‘conspiracy theories’ as it is used in this research and theories regarding what might be
referred to as real conspiracies. Barkun (2015, p. 168) notes the difference between
theories dealing with the many “real secret conspiracies, planned and carried out by two
or more people” and ‘conspiracy theories,’ which are “intellectual constructions, ways of
thinking… imposed on the world to give events a semblance of logic” (Also see Bale,
2007). From operations COINTELPRO, CHAOS, and Gladio to the Iran-Contra affair,

4

many outlandish and conspiratorial-sounding claims are emphatically true. For example,
the proposition that postwar Italy saw key figures from the CIA, Mafia, Catholic Church,
and the ranks of recent ex-fascists collaborate in a years-long clandestine operation that
involved a series of violent false flag attacks in order to maintain a ‘strategy of tension’
and ensure Communist forces’ defeat at the ballot box likely sounds almost as spurious
and conspiratorial as your average QAnon theorist’s ravings. The same goes for the idea
that the highest levels of American government were involved in secret drugs-for-arms
deals with ostensible enemy regimes. Indeed, many who held these positions at the time
were written off as delusional conspiracists, only to be vindicated decades after the fact. I
will restrain myself by only giving cursory mention to more recent and as of yet
‘unlegitimized’ theories surrounding events like the Dutroux Affair and the 2019 arrest
and death of Jeffery Epstein. These real conspiracies clearly give the ‘conspiracy
theorists’ to whom I refer a degree of legitimacy, or at least provide them with some
cover in the form of uncertainty. So, we can say that these actually existing conspiracies
are “separate from, but integral to” the type of ‘conspiracy theories’ on which this
research focuses (Christman, 2019).
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section will attempt to offer context on the state of research on the broad
topic of the internet’s effects on conspiracy theories and their post-‘disproval’ evolution.
In doing so, it will situate my research within the existing literature and provide the basis
for the analysis to follow. Because of the topics vaguely esoteric nature, and because of
its unique position at the intersection of multiple disciplines, the review will be divided
into three main sections. The first will offer a brief account of the existing works on
5

conspiracy theories as political phenomena, taking as its point of departure Richard
Hofstadter’s seminal 1964 work The Paranoid Style in American Politics. The second
segment will centre on the psychological and sociological factors surrounding the crucial
concept of cognitive dissonance, specifically in the context of cults and conspiracy theory
communities. The final section of the review will look into the small but growing body of
work devoted to the internet’s effects on conspiracy theories and similar social
phenomena. By establishing a firm and multifaceted theoretical and contextual backing
from which to proceed, this account of the literature will allow for the analysis to follow.
Conspiracy Theories as a Purpose-Serving Political Force
Hofstadter’s (1964) pathologized account of conspiracy theories and the ‘paranoid
style’ that believers often exhibit is surely the most influential and well-known work on
conspiracy in American politics. It identifies several important characteristics of
conspiracy theories that can be applied to seemingly disparate cases, from anti-Masons of
the late 1700s to the John Birch Society of the second Red Scare. The paranoid style is
characterized by “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”
(Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17). Although the conspiracy theorist shows an “almost touching
concern with factuality” in researching the minute details of the theory, and although they
often begin from defensible premises (e.g., the Masons are a secret organization whose
members hold outsize influence in political, social, and economic life, and this is bad),
the hostility to the identified malefactors of society is expressed through an “apocalyptic
and absolutist framework” that makes sweeping assertations about the purported
conspirators’ influence and morality (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17). So, in Hofstadter’s
account of conspiracies surrounding Freemasonry, it is not just a bad idea with some
6

negative consequences for the democratic spirit, it is “the most abominable but also the
most dangerous institution that ever was imposed on man, an engine of Satan… dark,
unfruitful, selfish, demoralizing, blasphemous, murderous, anti-republican and antiChristian” (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17).
Though Hofstadter’s account is seminal to the academic study of conspiracy
theory and identifies many real and important phenomena as outlined above, its account
of conspiracy theory as individual pathology obscures several important aspects of such
theories, as it fails to account for belief in conspiracy as a legitimate form of collective
political behaviour. In contrast, Hellinger (2003, p. 204) takes pains to treat conspiracy
theory as “collective, subjective behavior that deserves to be integrated into, not
marginalized from, explanations of a structural and historical character.” Here, we must
attempt to empathize with the seemingly pathological individuals who believe even the
most ridiculous and far-fetched theories, because although Hofstadter’s theory of a
‘pathological personality’ that is primed to be more susceptible to conspiratorial thinking
may well be true, it is also true that as mass political and social phenomena, conspiracy
theories arise out of real basic grievances, and gain followers and influence under certain
socioeconomic conditions. Indeed, even Hofstadter conceded that conspiracy theories
arise from “the mass sentiment that popular sovereignty and republican principles are
threatened by concentrated economic power and the exercise of American imperial power
in world aﬀairs” (Hofstadter, in Hellinger, 2003, p. 202). Conspiracy theories,
nonsensical as they may be, are attempts at understanding the world and addressing
anxieties about it. They are reflective of the way that groups of (alienated, atomized)
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people view the world at large, including political activity (Gramsci, 2000, in Marcovic,
2018, pp. 9-11).
Yet in attempting to address these anxieties, conspiratorial thinking fills the void
where clear thinking and rigorous academic analysis of the broad structures of society
should be. It is the product of individuals vainly trying to make sense of the broad
structural forces that influence their lives, an attempt to introduce a more easily
understandable and palatable explanation for the world’s ills by substituting subjectivity
and individual accountability in the place of the impersonal and structural forces that
social scientists and historians say shape the world (Hellinger, 2003, p. 208). Berlet
(1997, p. 217) offers a partial definition of conspiracy theory as ‘‘a narrative that blames
societal or individual problems on a scape-goat,” and holds that although the basic
grievances of conspiracy theorists often have merit, the theories they create are not
helpful in explaining them, and amount to nothing more than “a parody of institutional
analysis.” Similarly, Albert (1992, in Hellinger, 2003, p. 206) warns that “conspiracy
theorizing, even at its best, detracts from the diﬃcult but worthy task of trying to
understand society in order to change it.”
Groh’s analysis, similar to Hellinger’s, sees conspiracy theories as mass responses
by fragmented, individualized people to impersonal forces they cannot hope to control or
understand, but goes further by introducing the crucial idea of conspiracy theories as a
therapeutic coping mechanism (Groh, 1987). Harding and Stewart (2003, p. 263-4)
develop this idea more fully:
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Therapeutic culture and conspiracy theory entwine through their separate and
sometimes conﬂicting or competing uses of a shared set of modernist interpretive practices
that oppose the forces of the rational to the irrational, the transparent and true to the
arcane and hidden. With a passion bordering on epistemophilia, both claim a sublime
pleasure in revealed knowledge and hermeneutic mastery, in the eﬀort to uncover and
recover lost or secreted knowledge, cracking codes, sifting through signs, symptoms, and
overdetermined webs of feeling in search of the telling detail. Both rationalize the link
between the subject and the world by scanning for signs of agency, dysfunction, and ﬁt and
by gathering disparate signs into a narrative drama of transformation, encounter, risk, and
conversion. Both uncover an underlying plot that combines radical doubt with the sense
that the truth is out there.
Similarly, Hofstadter (1964, p. 38) notes that the paranoid “has little real hope that his
evidence will convince a hostile world,” and that amassing ‘evidence’ is instead a
“defensive act which… protects him,” indicating some personal psychological benefit to
engaging in conspiratorial thinking.
Flowing from this dynamic is another key aspect of conspiracy theory- that it is,
above all else, based in powerlessness and spectacle. Although the false narrative created
by the conspiracy theorist often has an exciting conclusion in which the evil conspirators
are exposed and defeated, the individual conspiracy theorist typically has little or no part
to play in this final confrontation. This makes sense, given the individual nature of the
theorist and the overwhelming power he attributes to the conspirators. In fact, some
observers go so far as to say that this powerlessness is the most important factor of
conspiratorial thinking. Robins and Post (1997, p. 55), for example, make the compelling
9

argument that “the most powerful value of conspiracy thinking is to remove
responsibility from the person or group believing itself to be the victim of the conspiracy”
(Also see Bader, 1999, p. 7). Here too, we see the therapeutic nature of conspiracy
theories, as they allow people to offload responsibility for various personal and social
problems and justify inaction.
Conspiracy theories’ basis in powerlessness, as well as all the other characteristics
outlined above, have been present throughout the history of American politics, and
though the introduction of mass media over the course of the 20 th century mutated
conspiracy theories to a degree, they seem to have remained inextricably linked to these
characteristics. Clearly, conspiracy theories are a unique and noteworthy political force,
with attributes that make them and their internal logics significantly different from other
power-seeking political groups. But for a look into the processes that such theories
undergo when faced with overwhelming ‘disproval,’ we must turn to fields such as
sociology, psychology, and even communications studies. It is to these crucial aspects of
the study of conspiracy theory (and such theories’ post-‘disproval’ trajectories) that this
literature review now turns.
Cognitive Dissonance Among Conspiracy Theory Communities
Any account of the literature on cognitive dissonance, and certainly any one
working within the context of conspiratorial thinking, must begin with Festinger, Rieken,
and Schachter’s (1956) foundational and agenda-setting work on the subject. In
particular, their well-known 1956 sociological study When Prophecy Fails has long been
the point of departure for studies of cults and conspiracy theories faced with ‘disproval’
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among scholars of varying theoretical backgrounds (Bader, 1999, p. 3; Jenkins, 2018, p.
2). As such, a brief account of the original research is warranted. In this classic study, the
researchers engaged in a long-term participatory research project, embedding themselves
in a UFO cult called the Seekers, whose leader had prophesized a coming judgement day.
This was done in order to better understand the ways in which cult members dealt with
the predicted empirical failure of their dearly-held theory. Their counterintuitive finding,
that after the Seekers’ prophesized judgement day failed to materialize the group gained
members and became more committed to the cause, is now nearly common knowledge
among many scholars in the field (Bader, 1999, p. 3).
The authors lay out five key criteria that must be met in order for such a post‘disproval’ renaissance to occur: 1) there must be a deeply held belief with some bearing
on how one acts; 2) the belief-holder must have made some significant commitment to
that belief; 3) the belief is overtly falsifiable; 4) such falsification must be recognized by
the believer; and 5) the believer must have a social support network encouraging the
belief (Festinger, Rieken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 7). If these conditions are met, the
authors contend, the drive to avoid cognitive dissonance will necessarily result in the
uptick in support seen in the case of the Seekers. This reading of conspiracy theories’
post-‘disproval’ trajectories, as bound to metastasize and make gains in both size and
degree of commitment, was for decades broadly considered received wisdom among
sociologists, psychologists, and others interested in cognitive dissonance’s effects on
fringe group structures (Bader, 1999, p. 3; Dawson, 1999, p. 3). Indeed, significant
support for some version of this basic theory remains prevalent in many circles to this
day (Taddicken and Wolf, 2020, p. 2).
11

Yet Festinger, Rieken, and Schachter’s work is by no means sacrosanct, and
indeed has been complicated by a number of scholars in the seven decades since its
publication. Chief among these criticisms is the problem of observational interference, a
major intervening factor that went unnoticed for decades and significantly undercuts the
study’s validity (Bainbridge, 1997, p. 137; Bader, 1999, p. 3; Jenkins, 2018). This general
criticism opened the door to many more, with an array of new theoretical perspectives
unleashed on the topic. The competing perspective that most overtly challenged the
general cognitive dissonance paradigm outlined thus far came in the form of a wave of
social choice theorists concerned with the study of religion in the 1990s, most notably
Laurence Iannoccone and Rodney Stark (Bader, 1999, p. 1). These scholars look to
contextual factors as playing a large confounding role in the individual and group
behaviours of a given conspiracy theory, applying a specialized version of cost-benefit
analysis to the logic of joining or remaining in a cult or other such group. Along these
lines, they claim that varying outcomes might befall a post-‘disproval’ conspiracy theory
or cult group, based on contextual factors that affect individuals’ self-interested
calculations to join, remain in, or leave such a group. While this line of reasoning
certainly adds some much-needed complication to the cognitive dissonance paradigm and
makes important contributions to this discussion, the shortcomings inherent in treating
conspiracy theorists as rational individual actors seeking to maximize their own benefit is
obviously problematic in its obliviousness to the possibility of non-rational psychological
processes and/or structural facilitating factors.
In conjunction with this analytic breakthrough came the rise of a decidedly more
balanced and multifaceted school of thought regarding the post-‘disproval’ prospects of
12

conspiracy theories. This paradigm is accurately and succinctly summarized by Lorne
Dawson’s impressive and particularly relevant 1999 article entitled When Prophecy Fails
and Faith Persists: A Theoretical Overview. This work is commendable for its gathering
of the results of some thirteen studies similar in nature to When Prophecy Fails and
analyzing their results as a comprehensive whole. As is shown in the article, the Seekers’
trajectory of increased commitment and membership numbers, while certainly a
possibility for other groups in a similar situation, is by no means the only path taken by
cults and conspiracy theory groups after their ‘disproval’ (Dawson, 1999, p. 3). In this
more nuanced perspective, post-‘disproval’ trajectories are determined by a myriad of
structural and individual contexts, as well as by the adaptational strategies pursued by the
group after its failure to deliver on the promised event. The unique combination of factors
surrounding any one group might lead it to one of the following ‘patterns of response,’ all
of which have been empirically recorded in at least one case: survival with a newfound
proselytizing mission, survival with a redoubled proselytizing mission, survival without
any effect on proselytizing, survival with a downturn in proselytizing, or survival with an
end to proselytizing (Dawson, 1999, pp. 3-5). Dawson’s focus on theory-specific
structural contexts in particular will be useful in my analysis, as will his extensive list of
exemplar cases.
But while the general theoretical models advanced by these authors doubtless
represent meaningful contributions to the literature on the topic, none make an attempt to
systematically measure and analyze what particular combination of factors result in each
particular outcome. Further, like the bulk of literature on conspiracy theories and related
phenomena, it is rather dated. As such, it fails to account for the role that the internet
13

might play in theories’ structural and stylistic development, and thus alter their
fundamental nature as well as their post-‘disproval’ trajectories. In order to supplement
this gap and allow for a more comprehensive analysis, my research aims to add an
internet-oriented dimension to this research. So, it is now necessary to examine the
existing literature on the effects the internet on conspiracy theories and conspiratorial
thinking.
The Internet’s Effects on Conspiracy Theories
Though the nexus of conspiracy theories and the internet is surprisingly
understudied, the closest thing to a consensus opinion among academics and reporters is
the intuitive view that conspiracy theories develop and spread much more rapidly due to
the introduction of a new, easily accessible means of mass communication and research
(Craft, Ashely, and Maksl, 2017, pp. 1-2; Hickle, 2018). Building off Stroud’s idea that
the internet offers a more diffuse means of political communication, Edy and RisleyBaird (2016, p. 13) note that public authorities and the traditional arbiters of truth are less
able to monopolize the public discourse online (Also see Taddicken and Wolff, 2020).
This is because of the powerful leveling force of the internet, wherein anyone with a wifi
connection can conduct their own research and communicate their ideas to a global
audience.
In their analysis of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, Edy and Risley-Baird (2016)
draw the important distinction between the ‘rumor chains’ and ‘rumor webs’ that defined
earlier eras of conspiracy theorizing and the new ‘rumor communities’ made possible by
the internet. In the past, due to the individualized and fragmented nature of society and
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communication (in turn due to limited technological and social development),
conspiratorial rumors were spread person to person (hence ‘chain’), and whether or not
the rumor spread was dependant on individual decisions to accept the rumor and
retransmit it. The introduction of mass media like radio and TV changed this dynamic
significantly, facilitating the mass transition of information and thus forming a sort of
‘rumor web,’ with an identifiable and heavily regulated center. It was only with the
advent of the internet, with its widely accessible, decentralized, unregulated, and, most
importantly, interactive structure, that ‘rumor communities’ could develop. Here, rumors
get bounced and refracted off of each other, as each member influences and is influenced
by the rumor as it spreads and develops. Now, thanks to the interactive nature of the
internet, individuals can co-construct the rumors and theories to which they subscribe as
they re-transmit them.
An unexpected effect of the internet’s leveling power is that although it speeds a
theory’s dissemination, it slows its development. Clarke, in his study of conspiracies
surrounding the 9/11 attacks and the possibility of an ‘inside job,’ finds that internetbased conspiracy theorists are discouraged from establishing a specific alternate theory of
events out of fear of being debunked (Clarke, 2007, p. 175). Because anyone can post
online, and because the overwhelming majority of people believe the ‘official story’ of
events, conspiracy theorists open themselves up to heavy criticism and debunking when
posting online. In order to avoid this dissonance, they refrain from forming and
advancing a specific theory with well-defined actors and motives, and remain at the stage
of ‘proto-conspiracy,’ with more time spent questioning the official story and pointing
out flaws and ambiguities in the accepted account of events (Clarke, 2007, p. 175-6). This
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dovetails with Edy and Risley-Baird’s (2016, p. 12) finding that repeated online
debunking of a conspiracy theory leads believers to cling to ambiguities in the official
story (“well fine, my story might be wrong, but so’s yours”). Clarke contrasts the several
specific conspiracies based around the JFK assassination, such as the one stating that “the
CIA did it because they thought JFK was going to shut the Agency down” to his more
recent case of 9/11 truthers, which presented no coherent account of definite actors or
motives.
It is a well-established fact that the instantaneous communication made possible
by the internet makes geographic space increasingly unimportant, ‘shrinking’ the world
even as the broader structural forces of globalization do the same (Miller, 2016; Heath,
2019). For this reason, Castells notes that conspiracy theories that arise online are often
more reflective of a cultural, political, or ideological movement than a geographically
defined one. In his estimation, the militias that sprang up across America in the 1990s
were not united by a geography (militias were common from the South to the Midwest to
the far West), but rather by shared right-wing views, Christian fundamentalism, and a
very vague sense of rural identity (Castells, 1997, p. 95-96). Because the vast majority of
‘the work’ of researching, developing, and disseminating conspiracy theories is now done
online, geographic proximity becomes less relevant, with the result of geographically
diffuse groups rather than concentrated “clusters” of believers. This is in contrast to the
geographically-influenced conspiracy theories of earlier eras, for example the antiMasons of the late 18th century, who were largely concentrated in New England despite
the Masons being just as influential in the South (Christman, 2019).
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James’ account of the internet’s effects on conspiracy theory emphasizes the lack
of hard borders or divisions between online communities or content, a product of the
medium’s unplanned, unregulated nature as well as its democratization of content
generation. The result is an amorphous form with permeable boundaries between and
even within online communities, which allows communities of conspiracy theorists to
develop much more easily. So, the internet promotes unity between diverse outgroups
who would otherwise remain fragmented and prone to conflict. This unity is based
largely on a “shared mythology of resistance” to the common enemy represented by the
mainstream account of events and its supporters and sources (James, 2000, p. 14). It is
reasonable to expect that the unifying force of the internet on conspiracy theorists will
yield broader and more loosely defined conspiracy theories.
Finally, the internet’s horizontal model of content production is important because
it hinders differentiation among sources like no other medium (Taddicken and Wolff,
2020, p. 1). This is seen especially clearly among older Americans, a group that grew up
without the internet and is now trying to navigate it. This is especially noteworthy in the
case of QAnon, as many of President Trump’s most vehement supporters are on average
rather old, and may well be drawn in by the theory’s pro-Trump spin. For an example of
the ways in which older internet users might be especially susceptible to conspiracy
theories online, consider the case of someone who grew up watching broadcast TV news,
(as in Edy and Risley-Baird’s ‘rumor web’) and who is now likely to attach as much
legitimacy and weight to a fringe website they get their news from today (Christman,
2019). Even further, and along these same lines, many presumably older Q-believers’
fundamental lack of understanding of even basic websites like 8Chan has led some to
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believe that Trump quotes Q posts as a covert wink to them, when in reality Q is
repeating things that Trump has already said while posting from another time zone
(Binder, 2019). Barkun (1994) extends this idea, first noting that once someone is
exposed to conspiracy theory as fact rather than hypothesis, it triggers a downward spiral
in which the subject increasingly surrounds themselves with news that confirms the
theory and discounts any news source that contradicts it. By rapidly introducing
susceptible people into the “cultic milieu” of conspiratorial sources of information, the
internet amplifies the cyclical logic of conspiracy theory (Barkun, 1994, p. 249). Indeed,
the related idea of algorithm-driven social media as an “echo chamber” has become
increasingly dominant among media and communications scholars (Brugnoli et al, 2019;
Taddicken and Wolff, 2020, pp. 1-2). These works, to varying degrees, attach this basic
contention to the broader theory of cognitive dissonance outlined in the previous section.
Based on a review of the literature, we can see that the study of conspiracy
theories (and the internet’s effects on them) exists at the intersection of a number of
disciplines, and has attracted the attention of scholars with diverse theoretical
backgrounds. Indeed, all such perspectives are necessary for a comprehensive
understanding of conspiracy theories as a political phenomenon, and as such are integral
to my analysis. Drawing on this literature in developing a comparative account based in a
longitudinal discourse analysis of QAnon-related content, this dissertation attempts to
answer the question: How has QAnon’s structure, style, and content evolved in the face
of increasing ‘disproval,’ and what does QAnon’s post-‘disproval’ trajectory tell us about
the internet’s effects on conspiracy theories? In doing so it sheds light on the curious case
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of QAnon, as well as on the broader issues of conspiracy theories’ post-‘disproval’
trajectories and the internet’s effects on them.
METHODOLOGY
In order to gain insight into this research question, my research examines the
extent to which conspiracy theories’ post-‘disproval’ trajectories are affected by
proponents’ widespread use of the internet. In particular, I attempt to see if QAnon
exhibits the classic characteristics of historical conspiracy theories in this regard, or if its
near-exclusively internet-based nature has left it slightly or even unrecognizably altered.
To this end, I conducted a longitudinal thematic discourse analysis of posts on 8Chan’s
/qresearch messageboard, an important locus of the QAnon conspiracy theory
community. These posts were chosen on the basis of systematic random selection from
five key periods in the theory’s recent history. Using a modified version of Braun and
Clarke’s (2006) 6-step thematic discourse analysis model, I examined these posts against
the backdrop of existing scholarly work on the established characteristics of conspiracy
theories and cognitive dissonance avoidance, and on the internet’s effects on recent
conspiracy theories, in order to see if the archetypal post-‘disproval’ trajectory of
conspiracy theory is still present, and to determine the ways in which any effects of the
internet on QAnon are influential.
In order to best develop this brief methodological sketch and grant further insight
into the ways in which the research was conducted, this section will proceed in two main
parts. The first outlines and contextualizes the data universe from which my sample posts
were drawn, and provides a brief account of my data selection method. In the second, I
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develop an account of the methodological model from which my analysis will proceed.
Throughout, this section will identify and address certain analytical pitfalls that I
encountered in conducting my analysis, as well as shortcomings in the basic models put
forward.
Dataset and Methodological Difficulties
As mentioned above, QAnon’s relatively unique status as a predominantly-online
conspiracy theory manifests itself not only in stylistic, structural, and content-based
mutations that make it a subject worthy of study, but also in particular methodological
complications that make any such study difficult to pursue. Some of these difficulties are
more easily dealt with, while others necessitate certain inescapable subjective judgements
on the part of the researcher. In explaining the dataset on which my research is based, this
section explains these difficulties, and justifies the solutions I developed in response to
them.
One of the primary reasons that QAnon is a subject worthy of academic study is
the huge following it has attracted over a relatively short time. It is difficult to imagine
the sheer volume of posts relating to QAnon that can be found on /qresearch alone, let
alone on 8Chan or on the internet at large. 8Chan’s /qresearch, the messageboard on
which I base this research, has upwards of 10,000 threads, each with hundreds or
thousands of posts and replies, but even this description fails to convey just how huge and
byzantine these boards really are. This massive scale, coupled with the disorienting
nature of the poorly-designed and -structured boards and the hateful, explicit, and
paranoid posts that populate them, make for a truly distressing and nightmarish reading
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experience. Curious readers are encouraged to visit
https://qanon.news/Analytics/ScatterPlot in order to get a better idea of the amount and
type of posts that make up the nuts and bolts of QAnon, though they do so at their own
risk of viewing extreme and explicit racism, misogyny, and otherwise distasteful and
objectionable content.
The unstable and transient nature of internet messageboard posts in general, and
of QAnon-related posts in particular, presents some unique methodological challenges.
4chan, the original home of QAnon, was permanently wiped of most Q content in
response to the El Paso shooting, the latest in a series of violent hate crimes to be
announced in advance on the site (Sommer, 2019c). For similar reasons, the several
QAnon-related subreddits have also been banned as of September 2018 (McGarvey,
2018). QAnon retains a strong presence on Twitter, Facebook, and other mainstream
social media sites, but this has not been where the bulk of Q-related posting has taken
place, and Q-related content on these sites are typically more centered on spreading the
message, and fail to exhibit the community-wide, focused, and purposeful decoding and
sense of community that my research seeks insight into. As a result, I have resorted to
analysing archives of the top /qresearch posts relating to QAnon. This in one of many
websites and online forums run by QAnon believers in an attempt to get the word out
about Q and provide a place to decode Q’s clues and build support for the cause. As such
it is publicly accessible, and so presents a valuable tool for my research. The good people
of the Qmmunity have helpfully provided several of these archives, the most useful of
which is qanon.news, which includes archives of all of Trump’s tweets and Q’s posts as
well as the whole of /qresearch. However, as the conspiracy theory continues to attract
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attention from law enforcement agencies, and as Q believers have been seen to act
somewhat erratically, the sites’ continued existence is uncertain at best.
In order to gain insight into the content and style of QAnon believers, I examined
in particular the archived posts from 8chan’s /qresearch messageboard, a major hub for
members of the Qmunnity to discuss the theory with one another and engage in ‘baking.’
This phenomenon of ‘baking’ is one of the most important features of QAnon as a theory
and community, done by the most committed Q-supporters in order to advance the theory
both within and beyond its current scope. In short, it entails the crowd-sourced research
into and speculative elaboration on Q’s cryptic posts. Certain specially-empowered
posters called ‘bakers’ collect articles, tweets, and other assorted content that could
possibly relate to Q’s clues into large list-like posts known as ‘dough’ (see exemplar post
5.3.3.3 below). This ‘dough’ is then investigated, connected, and otherwise riffed on by
other /qresearch posters. This process, of a relative few posts from Q being developed by
followers of the theory, continues indefinitely. With each member making up or selecting
their favourite version of events and Q merely prodding things along, we can say that
QAnon is in a very real sense a horizontally-organized co-constitutive online community.
By capturing the content and style of the posts of the theory’s most hardcore supporters
in the very place where much of ‘the work’ of the theory is done, /qresearch is uniquely
well-suited for my research, as it offers a view of Q’s most committed adherents in their
‘natural environment.’
Another methodological issue involves the varying degrees of irony used by
different posters on /qresearch. This is related to one of the major characteristic qualities I
identified in my previous research on this subject: the clash between two broad groups of
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/qresearch posters, the sincere older members and the more irony-savvy younger posters.
Even among the latter group, who are more representative of the broader non-QAnon
4/8chan community, there is some question as to whether the posters are sincerely
engaging with the theory in their own irony-poisoned way, or if they are there purely to
troll Q-believers. The problem here is discerning the meaning of certain posts, which
might be read as either sincere or ironic. One series of posts found in previous research
provides a simple and illustrative example of this dynamic, as the OP lays out a sincere
and extremely convoluted and nonsensical theory that ties QAnon to flat earth theory and
one poster replies “I have been thinking the exact same thing Anon.” This could be either
a sincere reply from another flat earth-curious /qresearch poster, or a bad-faith troll from
someone trying to mock the original poster and trigger further nonsensical responses.
This has obvious implications for any meaning-based analysis of the data. In many cases,
the sincerity of the poster is quite obvious, but in ambiguous cases like the one above, I
have used my own judgement in trying to account for this issue, relying on my extensive
experience in certain online communities and the eye for irony that comes with it.
In order to ensure that my randomly selected posts will be representative of the
community I am investigating, I had originally planned on analysing the most upvoted
posts from randomly selected threads on /qresearch, using upvotes as an indicator of a
given posts’ degree of support among the Qmmunity. Unfortunately, I was unable to do
so because these up/downvotes are not recorded in the archive and the posts are not
available in their original form online, as noted above. In order to circumvent this
difficulty and develop a proxy measure for posts’ popularity among the messageboard
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constituents in gathering my data, I selected every fifth original post (OP) with three or
more comments, up to three OPs per thread.
This purposeful iteration of systematic random selection is superior to a fully
random method, and better-suited to my research, for a few main reasons. Firstly, in
previous research I have found that selecting every fifth post with three or more
comments, up to three per thread, will allow for a relatively full account of each thread
examined (from the beginning to the end of each threads’ lifetime), without engaging
with an overly large dataset. Second, in the absence of the up/downvote indicator just
mentioned, this provides a decent approximation of the level of engagement a given post
received. Third, it allows for a sort of cross-section of the Qmmunity, in that posts with a
lot of comments are likely to be more popular, but also more controversial. So, the
comments under these posts are likely to reflect opposing viewpoints and rifts within the
forum and broader QAnon community, something particularly noteworthy in the context
of my analysis of fading/intensifying support for the theory in the face of disproval by
real-world events. Finally, by selecting OPs with ample comments, my dataset includes a
broad array of post types and lengths; in general, comments tend to be shorter than OPs,
and exhibit different stylistic, tonal, and content-based characteristics. For these reasons,
modifying a basic random selection model in this way was well-suited to my analytic
purposes.
Before proceeding further it is necessary to mention two minor caveats to this
model of systematic random selection, the first of which has to do with the ‘dough’ posts
explained above. These posts are exceptionally long lists, which almost always exist over
a span of several separate comments because they are too long to be posted as a single
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unit. Because these posts are all part of the same thought and made by the same poster,
and because not accounting for this would dramatically alter the data by skewing the
frequencies of certain themes, I chose to treat posts of this type as one single post, rather
than a series of them. A similar workaround was made with regard to a certain brand of
post that was clearly copy and pasted, and thus present in great numbers in almost all of
the threads I examined. This familiar post type is noteworthily long, and viciously antiSemitic even when compared to the objectionable baseline of /qresearch posts. Following
a similar logic as I applied to the ubiquitous ‘dough’ posts, I chose to exclude most of
these posts from the data, and instead only recorded the first in each series.
In order to keep track of this vast array of posts throughout the coding and
thematic development process, posts were each given a unique four-digit identification
number. The digits indicate, in order, the time period measured, the thread within that
time period, the OP within that thread, and the comment to that OP. For example, Post
1.2.3.4 is the fourth comment to the third OP found on the second thread pulled from the
first time period studied. Quoted or otherwise referenced posts are referred to by these
identification numbers for clarity’s sake.
Further along these lines, two brief notes on posts quoted here: First, in an attempt
to retain the unique style of /qresearch posts, no spelling or grammatical errors have been
corrected. Each post appears here exactly as it was originally posted, with the exception
that line breaks have been replaced with “//” in order to save space while retaining the
disjointed and schizophrenic style of many of the posts referenced here.
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The systematic random selection method outlined above was applied to three
randomly selected threads from each of five crucial periods in the theory’s recent
development:
1) The weeks in late October and early November 2020 leading up to the US Presidential
election (when there was still some reasonable degree of hope for a Trump victory and
the continuation of his grand saga).
2) The weeks in mid-November 2020, immediately after Trump’s electoral defeat (when
he was still president and there was some controversy about the legitimacy of the election
and hope for a legal resolution in Trump’s favour).
3) Early 2021, in the week immediately preceding Trump’s departure from office, up to
the now-infamous date of January 6th (when Trump was still president and some faint
glimmer of hope for a last-minute ‘Storm’ could possibly remain alive).
4) The days following the botched January 6th storming of the US Capitol (when it
became even clearer that a surprise victory for Trump or Team Q was not forthcoming,
but while Trump still remined in office).
5) The opening weeks of the Biden Administration in late January 2021 (when Trump
was no longer president and any hope of a coming ‘Storm’ was even more exceptionally
far-fetched).
These five periods are particularly suitable for my research into cognitive
dissonance among QAnon believers because they highlight key periods along the
theory’s descent into ever-increasing ‘disproval.’ Each time period signifies a break from
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the last, with a markedly higher degree of mental gymnastics necessary to continue
believing in the theory. Of particular note are two key disconfirming events included in
the studied period: Trump’s electoral defeat (in between periods one and two), and the
January 6 Capitol riot (in between periods three and four). In total, this selection model
yielded 262 individual posts from the /qresearch messageboard, spanning a period of
three crucial months in late 2020 and early 2021. It is from this dataset that my analysis
will now proceed, in an attempt to answer the intriguing and important question: How has
QAnon’s structure, style, and content evolved in the face of increasing ‘disproval,’ and
what effect has its basis on the internet had on this trajectory?
Discourse Analysis: Beyond Braun and Clarke
By systematizing and delineating a step-by-step model based on longstanding best
practices for thematic discourse analysis among psychologists and academics of other
related disciplines, Braun and Clarke’s (2006) work has, over the past two decades,
emerged as a paradigm in itself, boasting thousands of citations annually. The analytical
strengths of this particular method as a quantitative tool are well-established. Chief
among them is the model’s generalizability. Not only is it well-suited to a broad range of
psychological research, it is also readily applicable to discourse analyses in different
scholarly fields. Because of the niche and multidisciplinary nature of my topic of study,
and because of the many individual and collective psychological phenomena involved in
it, the use of this model is surely warranted, and provides a solid basis for my research
into and analysis of QAnon’s style and content.
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Aside from generalizability, the model presents a number of useful traits that
cement its relevance to my analysis. Primary among these is that the model allows for the
systematic qualitative analysis of large pools of data. As my dataset includes fully 262
individual /qresearch posts, this rigorous multi-step coding process was particularly
helpful. Another benefit that this model of qualitative thematic discourse analysis yields
is the ability to approach qualitative analysis in a systematic manner in such a way as to
limit potential biases (more on this later). Relatedly, it allows for the sort of pointed
qualitative analysis necessary to pursue my analysis while still allowing for a reasonable
degree of quantitative supplements. Finally, the use of thematic analysis in particular is
well-suited to my longitudinal study, as it will allow me to trace continuity and change
over time based on differing thematic prevalence- again, quantitative supplements will be
useful here.
Clearly, the model of thematic discourse analysis established by Braun and Clarke
(2006) is a valuable methodological tool for researchers at large, and for this work in
particular. Yet there are certain limitations to this model that leave it ill-suited to parts my
research, particularly its lack of longitudinal capacity. In order to remedy this, I have
amended and extended the basic and widely-used 6-step model through a variety of
means discussed here. The remainder of this subsection is devoted to a brief outline of
this basic model, and to the ways in which I plan on expanding it to complete my
proposed research.
The 6 steps or ‘phases’ of Braun and Clarke’s (2006, p. 87) model of thematic analysis
are:
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1- Familiarizing yourself with the data: After collecting 262 archived posts from
8Chan’s /qresearch messageboard on the basis of the systematic random selection
model outlined above, I read and reread them, searching for preliminary ideas for
codes, patterns, or themes which seemed useful for the later analysis.
2- Generating initial codes: I then developed nearly thirty preliminary codes based
on the gathered posts, and organized my dataset accordingly. These rudimentary
codes identify a very basic and noteworthy feature of the data across multiple
posts (e.g., if a post mentions Trump).
3- Searching for themes: Next, I searched for broader, more analytically useful
themes that might encompass one or more codes, and reorganized the data to
correspond to these potential themes. Themes were objectively and organically
pulled from the dataset, without undue bias or searching for themes particularly
useful to my thesis or analysis; as a result, some of the initial theme ideas
developed in this step were discarded as I pursued my analysis in the subsequent
steps. This objective selection followed by subjective judgement-based narrowing
allows the basis of my discussion to be analytically rigorous while at the same
time remaining pointed enough to be reasonably achievable within the scope of an
MRP.
4- Reviewing themes: After selecting the most relevant prominent themes, I studied
and refined them, taking special care to ensure the “internal homogeny” of codes
within each theme and the “external heterogony” of each theme compared to the
others, in order to make the themes coherent and meaningful. This step in
particular made my final analysis easier to construct and more readily
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understandable to readers (Patton, 1990, in Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 91). At this
stage, I discarded problematic or incomplete themes that made it past the initial
selection stage, and modified other, more salvageable but still analytically flawed
ones, for example, by breaking down into more manageable sections themes that
were too sprawling, or by grouping several small and related themes into one.
5- Defining and naming themes: At this stage, I further refined the identified themes,
giving each a clear definition and set of boundaries, as well as a meaningful and
parsimonious name to use in the findings and discussion to follow. I also further
examined how my finalized themes relate to one another, and began considering
how they reflect the dataset as a whole.
6- Producing a report: Next I developed a final, detailed report of my findings based
on the themes produced in the previous steps. This entailed the longform
identification, explanation, and interrogation of the most important and
noteworthy themes and features of the dataset, bolstered through the use of
selective examples. This qualitative explanation is presented alongside a
rudimentary quantitative account of the data, including the presentation of the
frequencies of the various themes in the form of a table and series of line graphs.
In doing so, I blend qualitative and quantitative methodologies in such a way as to
allow for a directed analysis of a particular theoretical issue while retaining
objectivity and a firm empirical basis.
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The ways in which this particular methodological model is well-suited to my
proposed research, outlined above, are clear. Yet there are certain aspects of my research,
namely its longitudinal nature, that necessitate important modifications to this basic
model. To this end, I altered the well-established 6-step method outlined above in a few
major ways.
The first noteworthy modifications have to do with necessary subjective judgements
undertaken during the thematic development process. In particular, I was faced with a
problem in developing certain themes (namely “Optimistic,” “Committed,” “Coupyearning,” and “Wildly delusional”) that could be said to apply to most nearly any and
every post on /qresearch. Since anyone who posts on /qresearch likely believes in the
core tenets of the broad QAnon conspiracy theory, any one of their posts could be read as
denoting delusion, unfounded optimism, and commitment to QAnon. However, the posts
I included in these categories were noteworthy for exhibiting a degree of the relevant
quality (optimism, delusion, etc) above and beyond the baseline seen on the forum, as
their primary quality. Whereas this difficulty has to do with the development process and
overabundant themes, another methodological difficulty deals with the selection process
and underabundant themes. It is to this minor adjustment that I now turn, before moving
on to problems that presented themselves later in the research process.
While allowing themes to emerge organically from the data is paramount to ensuring
the validity of the entire discourse analysis, which themes are discussed is another matter.
So, in order to develop my analysis along the lines of my research question, I employed
certain subjective judgements in selecting which codes and themes to include here.
Namely, I included four themes (Irl Action, Pessimism, Wavering Support, and Anti-Q)
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that were not particularly prevalent in the data. As will be seen, it is their very absence
that makes them noteworthy and deserving of inclusion in the context of my analysis.
Aside from these minor changes to the thematic selection process, other changes
pertaining to the report and discussion aspects of the research were also necessary.
In order to study QAnon’s development and change over time en route to answering
my research question, I compare the relative prevalence of themes and characteristics
found in data from the different time periods. I did so by initially treating data from each
of the five selected time periods as one, analyzing the data as a whole in order to ensure
an even and unbiased coding process. From there I separated the data into their five
respective time periods, and examined the incidence of the various identified themes in
each. In this way, I was able to develop the longitudinal aspect of my research in an
analytically rigorous fashion.
Another important adjustment made involves the presentation of my findings.
Because my discourse analysis produced twelve relevant themes, and because the
changing prevalence of these themes over five distinct time periods is of interest here,
particular attention was paid to avoiding the threat of overcomplication and confusion.
Simultaneously though, care was taken to retain the qualitative aspects that set discourse
analyses apart, and to convey to readers, through the use of quotes and other references to
the data, the ineffably bizarre nature of the /qresearch forum. To this end, the findings
presented here start with a brief report on each theme, followed by a broader report of the
findings. This final report is longitudinal in nature, noting key sites of continuity and
change between the five time periods and tracking trends as they become more or less
pronounced with time. Its main concern is with the broad trends of change and continuity
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seen between time periods, rather than particular thematic characteristics within a given
period. It is on the basis of this report that my final analysis proceeds.
In developing my longitudinal report, another extension to this basic methodological
model was required. In order to accurately reflect the frequency with which the themes
occurred in the various time periods, I was forced to first record the raw values for each
theme in each time period, and then to convert this value into a percentage of posts in that
dataset. In this way I was able to accurately find and present the changing frequencies of
the themes in the dataset, and thus to track the changing discursive style of /qreserach.
A final problematic aspect of Braun and Clarke’s methodology that my analysis was
forced to circumvent is its lack of comparative analytical potential. In order to answer my
research question, I compared QAnon’s changing nature in response to increasingly
unlikely real-world conditions with the basic manifestations of cognitive dissonance and
conspiracy theorist behaviour seen in scholarly works dealing with earlier, non-internetcentric conspiracy theories. The basic model outlined above ends with a theme-centric
report of the findings, and thus does not allow for such an analysis. In order to address
this, my research goes a step further, analyzing the results of my findings against the
existing literature on conspiracy theories, cognitive dissonance, and the internet’s effects
on them. By viewing my discourse analysis report against the backdrop of established
traits and trajectories of conspiracy theories at large, this modification allows
examination of how QAnon and its post-‘disproval’ evolution differs from or resembles
pre-internet conspiracy theories to better understand the internet’s effects on conspiracy
theories.
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FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION
In order to answer this research question, present readers with a vivid description
of the /qresearch environment, and build my arguments surrounding QAnon and the
internet’s effects on conspiracy theories’ post-disproval evolutions, this analytical section
will proceed in four main parts. First is a rundown of the twelve themes identified in the
discourse analysis. Under subheadings, each theme is defined and described with the help
of illustrative exemplar posts. These subsections also include some brief discussion of
what each theme’s presence in the data indicates about the nature of conspiracy theories
in general, and about QAnon and its /qresearch messageboard in particular. Next, aided
by the use of some rudimentary tables and graphs, I develop my thoughts and analysis
more fully in a broad findings section, where I engage with the dataset as a whole from a
longitudinal perspective. Here I examine the changing frequencies of each theme over
time and identify trends and correlations in the data. I then discuss the implications of
these findings as they pertain to QAnon’s changing nature as a primarily internet-based
conspiracy theory faced with ever-increasing degrees of disproval in a brief interpretation
section. Finally, I review these findings in the context of the existing relevant literature,
comparing and contrasting the conclusions drawn about /qresearch’s post-disproval
trajectory in the previous section to patterns identified by scholars working with older,
non-internet-centric conspiracy theories. In doing so, I hope to convey to the reader a
sense of the singular discursive style of /qresearch, shed light on the trajectory of the
broader QAnon conspiracy theory community, and gain insights into the effects that the
internet has had on this trajectory.
Themes
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Baking
Unique among the themes identified here in that it denotes the type of post that
/qresearch is based around and designed to facilitate, and further unique in that it is a
discursive practice wholly new to QAnon as a continuously co-created internet-based
conspiracy theory community, this designation refers to posts that are, first and foremost,
engaged in the act of ‘baking’ outlined earlier. These posts, with their workmanlike
seriousness in the application of twisted paranoid logic, are in many ways unlike the
other, more overtly emotive posts discussed below. It is here more than anywhere else
that we can see the work of perpetuating the QAnon theory being done, as posters engage
in a cooperative and mutually-encouraging cycle of schizophrenic connection-making.
One major type of post that is included in this theme are what is referred to among
/qresearch posters as ‘dough,’ as described above. These exceedingly common posts are
comprised of lists of seemingly random news events and facts, which posters then ‘bake’
into more finished overarching theories. A short excerpt from Post 5.3.3.3 serves to
illustrate the schizophrenic nature of these posts, and gives readers some insight into the
disorienting nature of QAnon and the /qresearch forum:
“Deutsche Bank Reports Huge Loss for 2019// The President's Super Bowl
Ad!!!!// House Climate Chair Calls For Google To Censor ‘Climate Deniers//
Barr: Militant Secuularists// Scavino/ Potus revisited// Russia closes its Far East
border with China in attempt to prevent spread of new coronavirus…”
Posters then take these series of disparate (and often fictional) events, filtered through
each other’s interpretations of them, and make connections in order to decode Q’s clues
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and gain greater insight into the plan. For a good example of the ridiculous yet selfserious nature of the posts found under this theme, and of type of content baking typically
deals with, we can look to Post 4.3.3.0 and the responses to it:
4.3.3.0: Also, noticed POTUS said "tolerided" or "tolerited" instead of tolerated
any longer. Anyone know what that could mean?
4.3.3.1 don't think it was intentional// he seemed irritated and not himself// he's a
pretty cool cookie// can't help but think something was up// lack of sleep finally
caught up?// up 3 days planning shit?// or rattled from an assassination attempt? ya that kind of rattled, not saying it happened, just my review of his demeanor
4.3.3.2: telleride colorado, big mining town.// Lots of tunnels and uranium
4.3.3.3: There were several interesting decodes earlier this morning. qresear.ch is
your friend
Posts of this nature can generally be interpreted as indicative of a high degree of
commitment to QAnon and the /qresearch community, insofar as sacrificing one’s time
and energy in service of a political project indicates commitment (Bader, 1999, p. 10).
That said, it is important to keep in mind that the ‘work’ of baking consists almost
exclusively of spinning fantastical theories and posting one’s political beliefs and
grievances online, and so it does not necessarily reflect as high a level of commitment as
organizing and participating in political action in the real world. When ‘working to save
the world’ entails searching for hidden references to Q in new Netflix shows and posting
about it (as is the case in Post 5.1.3.1: “Main CIA character‘s car License plate 12Q-1256
(Q17)// CIA co-character name “Q”// dialogue: “Bigger than you can imagine// dialogue:
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“Eye of the storm…”), why not join in the fun? Further, the quotes presented here reveal
a discursive style not unlike the one identified by Hofstadter (1964, p. 38) in his
discussion of conspiracy theorists’ evidentiary style and motivations. Indeed, it seems
unlikely that even the posters quoted above would have any hope that their statements
would convince outsiders of anything.
Even still, there is some baking-related work being done here that requires a real
degree of commitment and sacrifice, which should not be overlooked. Laughable as they
may often be, members of /qresearch are actively engaged in the nuts and bolts of
political organizing and community building. In one illustrative example of this
organizing work in action (Posts 5.2.2.0-5.2.2.3) we see a few posters earnestly
discussing the logistics of planning a sort of training session to help attract new bakers. In
particular, the OP seems to display a genuine earnestness and willingness to engage with
the practicalities of organizing: “Thinking about doing a baking class / presentation…For
anons interested in baking, obviously, it could be taught step by step through slides
(which I can make), and through practictical baking, again step by step.// We could all do
it together. Kek” In the context of an otherwise politically disaffected group of people
(even by the dismal standards of modern-day America), this is no small task.
Irl Action
This theme includes /qresearch posters’ references to engaging in real-world (i.e.
not online) acts motivated by their belief in QAnon. For the blissfully uninitiated in
internet slang, “irl” is shorthand for “in real life.” The mere existence of this acronym, let
alone its frequent and meme-like use in certain corners of the internet (/qresearch
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included), suggests both a clear bifurcation between the online environment that hosts the
Qmmunity and the world of real social, physical interaction, and, in some cases the
impact of the former on the latter. This could take the form of conducting real-world
research into the theory, or, more notably, organizing and attending Q-branded gatherings
and protests. The latter type of real-world engagement can be seen most prominently in
the case of the January 6 capitol riot, where thousands of Q-believers and other assorted
Trump supporters (and indeed, more than one /qresearch poster) engaged in a planned
and premeditated illegal political display in the heart of the American capital.
QAnon’s nature as a primarily internet-based conspiracy theory sets it apart here
too. In the past, underdeveloped technological and communicative conditions meant that
every conspiracy theory or fringe political movement necessitated a degree of
commitment and real-world action. Even if that action was as limited as attending
meetings of similarly-minded individuals, it still signals a degree of commitment not
necessarily held by someone merely posting on the internet. So, we might reasonably
conjecture that posting on /qresearch does not denote the same degree of commitment to
a community that say, attending a Bircher rally in the 1970s did, and that by and large the
general membership of the Qmmunity, at least insofar as it exists on /qresearch, is more
lax in its degree of commitment to the cause than followers of older, less conveniently
online, conspiracy theory communities.
The presence of this type of post in the dataset is noteworthy in that it shows that
some fraction of /qresearch posters are genuinely committed to the QAnon theory, so
much so that they are willing to sacrifice their time, effort, and potentially their freedom
and comfort, in service of a politically-motivated project (Bader, 1999, pp. 5, 8). This
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theme is therefore of particular importance, as it is QAnon’s potential to mobilize
Americans into real-world political action that makes it a subject worthy of academic
study from the perspective of political science.
Posts of this nature also serve an important function within the /qresearch
discourse itself, as they signal to other posters their high degree of commitment to the
theory and seek validation and encouragement for it (Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter,
1956, p. 10). For example, in response to a fellow poster asking who else on the forum
would be at the capitol on January 6, post 3.3.2.0 (“We’re leaving at 4am. Truck packed
and ready!”) provides the original poster with a sense of encouragement and support
while also displaying to the group (and to oneself) the sacrifices the poster is willing to
make in service of their commitment to the theory. The supportive and comraderyinducing effects of this type of post can be further seen in the responses to it: it was met
with a slew of fully seven supportive and good-natured posts wishing the poster luck,
warning them to “stay frosty,” and signalling that they too would be at the rally.
Coup-Yearning
As its name suggests, this theme includes posts that are primarily concerned with
fantasizing about QAnon’s climactic event, a military coup in the form of The Storm. As
was mentioned in the methodology section, certain themes necessitated a degree of
subjective judgement in the categorization process by virtue of the fact that all or almost
all posts on the board inherently express some degree of the theme; Coup-Yearning is one
such theme. It is important to remember that virtually all adherents to the QAnon
conspiracy theory have, as the endpoint and object of desire for their worldview, a
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military coup. That said, this theme includes only those posts whose primary focus is the
discussion of and support for a coup, as in Post 2.3.1.1 from just after Trump’s electoral
loss in November 2020, when The Storm failed to happen as some expected: “Real
question is// WHERE THE FUCK IS MILITARY?” This familiar type of post, seen
throughout the dataset, betrays an unmistakably genuine and deeply-held wish for an
undemocratic takeover of the government and a purging of society.
Like the previous theme, the presence of posts of this nature is of particular import for
the study of QAnon from the perspective of political science, as it implies that /qresearch
posters are a power-seeking political group, rather than a more benign social community
with fringe beliefs and paranoid tendencies. Unlike the Irl Action theme, however, this
theme has nothing at all to do with real-world sacrifice or risk-taking, and is much more a
product of the adoption of a simplistic comfort-seeking worldview.
As the apocalyptic event meant to right the world and bring about utopia, The Storm
occupies a huge amount of mental space for members of the Qmmunity, and their
discussions of it have the potential to offer us useful insights into the psychological
processes motivating adherence to QAnon. Indeed fantasizing about The Storm is key to
QAnon as a social phenomena, as it offers followers an endpoint beyond the depressingly
mundane and unending alienation of ‘normal’ life, and a promise that the villains
responsible will be held accountable (Bertlet, 1997, p. 217; Robins and Post, 1997, p. 55).
The posts serve the function of allowing followers to vent their alienation from and anger
towards those in power and engage in escapist fantasies, all in a way that affirms the
theory as true and worthwhile.
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Another post, numbered 2.2.3.3 and also from November 2020, is revealing in this
regard: “the people who are actively right now committing fraud should be arrested in the
middle of this shitshow of a celebration to teach the fuckers who threatened us our
President shit they even killed cops and citizens .. They should get arrested and
charged…if anyone gets out of hand arrest them and try them for treason now….not in a
day or a week or a month.” Clearly, posts of this nature come from people who are
alienated, fixated on revenge, unstable, unhappy, and politically-minded.
Committed
As the name suggests, this theme includes posts exhibiting noteworthy outward
displays of commitment to Q, Trump, and/or the broader QAnon project and community.
Again, this categorization is reserved for posts whose primary and most striking
characteristic is their display of support for and commitment to the cause, rather than the
ambient pro-Trump, pro-Q sentiment inherent to /qresearch. For example: “…We stood
up and took a great fight. And we still do it. Because we use our common sense that
allows us to see that world is going in a wrong direction. Very very bad direction…”
(Post 2.2.2.6).
These posts serve an important function in the community by allowing posters to
demonstrate their support for the theory to both themselves and the rest of the forum
(Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 10). This has the self-reinforcing effect of
cementing one’s in-group status as a Q-supporter, as well as signalling to other posters
that their beliefs are shared, and that they ought to voice support too. In the context of a
self-reinforcing and dissonance-avoidant conspiracy theory community, it is reasonable
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to assume that any contradiction of the theory will be met with an increased incidence of
posts of this nature (Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 245).
To better illustrate the self-reinforcing quality of these posts we can look to
excerpts from Posts 2.1.1.6 and 2.1.2.0, each made in response to posts from disillusioned
former-QAnoners berating /qresearch posters after Trump’s electoral defeat. The former,
in a model of post common to this theme, more or less blindly repeats back the basic
QAnon narrative: “Under the hood, people are sharing the truth like crazy and it's
unstoppable. The election was a massive fraud, and the people who voted for Trump are
figuring it out. The next step is when the people figure out that the cabal all worship satan
and rape and sacrifice people, especially children.” In an even more obvious case of
classical cognitive dissonance avoidance as described by Festinger, Reicken, and
Schachter (1956, p. 238), Post 2.1.2.0 reads: “We could have never weathered this shit
storm without Q, every day that goes by the more impossible it is to dismiss Q.” Twisted
as it might seem in the face of mounting contradictory evidence, this last statement is
absolutely true to the QAnon believer – every day they invest more and more psychic
energy into the truth of the theory, and so every day they become more assured in their
commitment.
Optimistic
Posts in this category express a high degree of faith in the QAnon theory and
cause, and an often smug assurance that the events it predicts will soon come to pass.
Like several of the other themes identified here, Optimistic posts are of interest mainly
because of the role they play in enforcing cognitive dissonance avoidance within the
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/qresearch community; for example: “people are sharing the truth like crazy and it's
unstoppable. The election was a massive fraud, and the people who voted for Trump are
figuring it out. The next step is when the people figure out that the cabal all worship satan
and rape and sacrifice people, especially children” (Post 2.1.1.6). This post and others
like it serve to express to other /qresearch posters that their belief is shared and
reasonable, and thus to keep the community committed and, crucially, pleasant to engage
with (Bader, 1999, pp. 8, 10; Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 245).
In addition to this core insight, analysis of posts in this category can shed further
light on the aforementioned offloading of conspiracy theorists’ insecurities, resentments,
and fears into the theory’s fruition. In response to a troll impeding the board’s function
and mocking posters there as pathetic and delusional, Post 1.1.3.6 says: “But you know
anon, doesn't matter in the end, the games can't stop what's coming ;-).” Here we can see
the redirection of the stress and resentment of personal confrontation into the theory and
its expected effects. Rather than feel embarrassed after being cruelly mocked, this poster
instead gets to feel smugly superior and confident that this bully will, along with all other
malefactors in his life, soon be silenced by The Storm. This same dynamic is played out
time and again on the board regarding any number of broader cultural, political, and
economic grievances, all the while offering optimistic posters a sense of comfort and
blind hope that the future will be better than the present.
Making Excuses
This theme is comprised of posts whose primary character is one that expresses
the twisted excuse-making and mental gymnastics necessary for people to continue
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believing in what is an overwhelmingly and increasingly unbelievable theory. Insofar as
it can be seen as a manifestation of cognitive dissonance avoidance, this theme has a clear
relation to the Optimistic and Committed themes outlined previously. Posts like this allow
members of the Qmmunity, for themselves as well as for others, to affirm their
commitment to the theory, especially when faced with a disconfirming event (Festinger,
Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 245). For example, in rationalizing why rather than
seizing power and enacting The Storm Trump had, for four years, governed in a more or
less conventional way and then lost his bid for re-election, one poster conjectured that
“…Trump has deliberately given his enemies lots of rope over the past few years so they
can't help but implicate themselves in crimes// Tick Tock” (Post 2.3.2.3).
Because of the huge mental weight attached to the theory’s validity, these excuses
are often baroque in their scope and attention to detail. Post 5.1.2.0 provides an
instructive example. After an essay-length justification for why the epochal plot to save
the world from evil was being run off of a low-quality messageboard that frequently
malfunctions, the post ends with the assertation that “Each move was not a failing on the
Q team, but a predetermined move based off of where the Q team need us to be at the
given time”
The semblance between this cloyingly self-serious post and the delusional
sentiments observed by Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter (1956, pp. 214, 245) is
striking. But in its baroque degree of development and unmistakable style, is also
reflective of certain traits that Hofstadter (1964, pp. 17, 35) identified as characteristic of
his paranoid personality. So, beyond the key purposive quality referenced above, these
posts also serve as yet another reminder that QAnon is emphatically not a rational
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political community, and is instead guided by complex psychological and social
responses to alienation and cognitive dissonance.
Pessimistic
An obvious counterpart to the Optimistic theme discussed above, as well as to the
Wavering Support and Anti-Q sections below, this categorization denotes posts that
display a lack of faith in the Q project and community, and a sense of depression, doubt,
and engagement with reality that is otherwise rarely seen on the board. Posts of this
nature are obviously indicative of a poster ‘losing the faith’ and questioning the Q
narrative, and likely presage the poster leaving the forum and the broader Qmmunity
(Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, pp. 176, 185). This might be in response to a
certain set of circumstances surrounding the content of the theory (for example, after
Trump lost the 2020 election in November of that year, as in the case of Post 2.1.1.0,
discussed below), or by other, more interpersonal grievances with the theory and
community.
Rather than continuing to draw on the seemingly endless supply of faith-based
positivity, rationalizations, and mental gymnastic ability seen in most of the posts and
posters in the dataset, here instead we see some of the aggrieved and alienated people that
make up the Qmmunity expressing the sense of dislocation and betrayal engendered by
their dawning realization that help is not, in fact, on the way.
For an instructive example of this type of post, we can look to Post 2.1.1.0, from
less than a week after the QAnon narrative was dealt a major blow in the form of
Trump’s electoral defeat: “confidence in the election process has been destroyed// neither
45

side will be satisfied with either outcome// media has a strangle hold on information//
psyops everywhere, including Q.// You think posting a flag picture is helpful
motherfucker?// violence is coming next. expect assassinations. this is RIPE for foreign
agents to be used to trigger us into a full out civil war and then sweep up the mess when
we're all dead.” Here we see a genuinely dejected, depressed individual lashing out at
their former community, someone who has channelled their fears and alienations into a
comfortable narrative, only to come to the unfortunate realization that this narrative is not
bringing them relief. The recently-disenchanted erstwhile Q-believer is clearly upset, and
displays classic characteristics of someone faced with overwhelming cognitive
dissonance. It is also important to note that this poster is not by any means deradicalized
or no longer receptive to conspiracy theories, and is instead merely disenchanted with the
particular narrative of QAnon. This poster, as we can reasonably conjecture from the raw
sentiments betrayed in the post, is left in the unenviable position of being returned to the
alienating and depressing world that made escapism-via-Q attractive to him in the first
place.
From the perspective of cognitive dissonance avoidance, we can reasonably say
that some occurrence of these type of posts and the sentiment they represent is nearly
unavoidable in the face of prophecy disproval, and to be expected among at least some
group members. Not everyone who makes the minimal psychic investment in posting on
an internet forum is going to be so committed as to remain ceaselessly positive in the face
of ever-mounting counterevidence (as is noted even in the classic model of cognitive
dissonance avoidance put forward by Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter, 1956, p. 10),
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and so inevitably some people are going to get discouraged and, eventually, snap out of it
(Bader, 1999, p. 3).
Wavering Support
Further down the line of deteriorating faith in the theory first seen under
Pessimism we see another even more subversive non-believer-related theme: those posts
that indicate a member of the community beginning to question the QAnon narrative, and
wavering in their loyalty to and belief in the theory and community. These posts are not
to be confused with those belonging to the following theme Anti-Q, which includes posts
that go a step beyond the faltering confidence captured here. Aside from the obvious
difference in content between questioning and outright denouncing the theory, there is a
striking tonal difference that separates the posts coded for Wavering Support and Anti-Q.
Namely, the former grouping is noteworthily earnest and genuine, especially in contrast
to the more angry, cruel, and self-assured denouncements found in the latter. We can take
this to mean that some of the posters in this category are still psychically attached to
QAnon to some degree, and are still looking to be convinced of its truth.
From this vantage we can see clearly that posts like this also serve a reassuring
discursive function within the community, acting to recenter the poster themselves, those
responding to them, and anyone reading. This type of discussion serves to keep those
considering leaving the Qmmunity in the fold by providing them with answers to
whatever questions they might raise, while simultaneously allowing responders to
demonstrate their superior knowledge of QAnon lore and commitment to the theory in
answering. For example, Post 3.2.1.0 asks in genuine earnestness regarding the theory’s
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plan of Trump, Q, and the White Hats seizing power, “what does it matter if the senate is
lost?” Within ten minutes, four separate posters have offered their take on the question,
each of them reaffirming the fool-proof nature of QAnon as a theory in a clear case of the
Qmmunity tending to its ideological boundaries by identifying potential apostates while
also providing grounds for reassuring these individuals of the theory’s relevance in the
face of ‘disproval.’
Anti-Q
The final nonbeliever-inclusive theme I discovered, this category is reserved for
posts that blatantly contradict QAnon as a theory and create dissonance in the /qresearch
community. This type of post mainly comes in the form of dejected recent ex-Qers
venting their pent-up grievances with the theory and forum, as in the case of Post 2.3.2.4,
from election night: “You are fucking delusional. It’s done. The Dems have stolen
Wisconsin at 5:00 am. They will steal Georgia and Pennsylvania too. Nobody is going to
prison.” These posts often disparage the figureheads of the movement, for example by
lamenting, as one poster did, that “Q chose a pretty fucked platform [8Chan] to run ops
from” (Post 5.1.1.2), or by saying outright: “Fuck Trump. He betrayed us. 4 years of bull
shit tweets and he never took any action” (Post 3.1.3.0).
Beyond these earnestly angry cases, the theme is also inclusive of posts made by
trolls, individuals from outside of the Qmmunity who are there solely to mock QAnon
believers, often through objectionable name-calling and cruel taunts about the
ridiculousness of the theory. These posters seek to elicit a response from their victims as
a sort of reward for their jokes, and correctly identify the dissonance-avoidant Qmmunity
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as a prime target. For an example of such a post, we can look at an excerpt of Post
2.1.3.0, which reads:
“REMEMBER, TRUMPO REFUSED TO LIFT A FINGER TO HELP WHITE
AMERICA AND HIS BASE WHEN HIS SUPPORTERS GOT BEATEN,
DOXED, FIRED, AND HARASSED// BUT TRUMPO COULDN'T WAIT TO
GIVE $500 BILLION OF YOUR MONEY TO BLACK PEOPLE WHO WANT
HIM DEAD// REMEMBER, TRUMPO STOMPED ON HIS OWN DICK FOR
THREE YEARS AND NOW WILL FLUBBER OFF TO FATSO GOLF WHILE
ALL OF HIS SUPPORTERS PAY THE PRICE FOR SUPPORTING HIM//
YOU ALL GOT CHUMPED, AND YOU STILL THINK A MAGICAL
ALPHABET LARP WILL SAVE YOU.”
In either form, these rare cases of a break in the otherwise fully self-reinforcing
system of the /qresearch forum invariably engender heated conflict, distasteful insults,
and violent threats from the larger Qmmunity. This is to be expected from a group faced
with abrupt and forceful disconfirmation in the very place they come to have their faith
reaffirmed.
Wildly Delusional
This theme captures what is, especially to the uninitiated, probably the most
initially striking aspect of the posts on /qresearch. The posts included here exhibit
common characteristics like paranoia, wild assertations, and an almost-schizophrenic
style of connection-making. This is in direct alignment with Hofstader’s famous
description of the paranoid style of conspiracy theorist discourse cited in the literature
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review (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17). Also in alignment with Hofstader’s diagnosis, they
range in intellectual complexity from the impressively highly developed and internally
coherent to the basely delusional and patently inscrutable (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 38). For
an example of this latter type of post, and in the hopes of conveying to the reader just
how disorienting and confusing spending time reading this sort of content is, I include
here an excerpt from Post 4.1.1.2:
“Pythagoras and Plato say that the number 3 in the cubed (ie 27) and number 2 in
the cubed (ie, 8) represent the Cosmos.// The sum of the 2nd through 7th
numbers: 2+3+4+5+6+7=27// And there is much more about Princess Diana,
Nostradamus// Maritime law and Israel// And lots of stuff.”
To the uninitiated or unfamiliar, this string of seemingly disconnected points would seem
bizarre and incoherent – what could maritime law and numerology derived from ancient
Greek philosopher have to do with Princess Di, Israel, or, just offstage, Donald Trump’s
electoral fortunes? But in the Qmmunity, this type of post is common and serves a key
function of providing flexible hinges that allow the various strands of conspiratorial
thinking to swing numerous ways. It opens discursive space for anything to be
incorporated into the QAnon theory playbook and potentially to become ideological
canon and politically actionable.
For another good example of this theme in action, and of the importance attached
by QAnoners to even the most mundane and seemingly unimportant events, we can
examine Post 4.3.3.0’s reference to Donald Trump, a 73 year old man known for gaffes
and odd verbal ticks, misspeaking: “Also, noticed POTUS said "tolerided" or "tolerited"
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instead of tolerated any longer.// Anyone know what that could mean?” The presence of
posts like this in the dataset tells us what anyone who has even the slightest experience
with QAnon likely already knows: that followers of this conspiracy theory are not bound
by rationality or logic in the way that many other power-seeking political communities
are. This quality cements QAnon as a verifiable conspiracy theory, and has obvious
implications for its post-‘disproval’ trajectory.
Further insight into the paranoid delusion that defines /qresearch can be gained by
looking to the ubiquitous references to “shills” and “MSM clowns” believed to be
interfering with the board in service of the cabal. Some posters decry others as “JQ shills”
trying to tarnish the board and theory by posting anti-Semitic content, while others
complain about the shills’ negative reaction to those very same anti-Semitic theories.
Regardless of their particular content-based predispositions, one thing shared in common
by all these posters is a paranoid conviction that they and their community are being
watched and interfered with by shadowy forces.
Conspiracy Theory Singularity
Included in this categorization of posts are those that minimize the Q-specific
aspects of the discussion (The Storm, Q’s coded clues, etc.) in favour of reference to
conspiracy theories at large (the JFK assassination, interdimensional lizardmen, the Book
of Revelations, etc.). It is crucial to note that these posts don’t necessarily contradict
QAnon or seek to discredit it in favour of some other theory; rather, they serve to work
the theory into the constellation of other extant conspiracy theories. Indeed, in the dataset
we see represented crank groups and ideas as disparate as the power of blood and
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bloodlines , libertarian Constitutionalist discourse , the truth about Building 7 , and fourdimensional time cubes. The presence of this type of post also indicates the presence of
seasoned conspiracy theorists, people who are used to thinking in these terms of wild
logical leaps and paranoid assertations, with many examples of what can intuitively be
catalogued as exhibiting Hofstadter’s (1964, p. 17) paranoid style.
Further longstanding conspiracy theories and related phenomena, from antiSemitism to anti-Catholicism to Protestant millenarianism are all represented here. For
an example of the fervent religiosity of the latter type and the obsession with biblical
minutia that so often comes with it, we can look at Post 2.2.3.4. After a paragraphs-long
and characteristically pedantic and self-serious dive into the original Hebrew translation
of Psalm 23:4, it notes that the Qmmunity should not be discouraged because “even in
death we do not need to fear, for God is with us, and He will protect and comfort us
through it all.” Another poster earnestly asks Q, among other things, “where are we in
Revelations right now?” The presence of religiously-minded posts in addition to the grabbag of other conspiracy theories mentioned above is revealing, as it implies a certain
unmistakable personality type among posters, defined by alienation and a search for
meaning.
As developed in the literature review’s discussion of conspiracy theories as social
and psychological phenomena, we can say confidently that conspiracy theories are, by
nature, individualized and individualistic. Ask ten QAnoners what the theory entails, and
you are likely to get ten different answers. Because of this fact, and especially so in the
context of the internet and its unprecedented information-sharing capabilities,
Hofstadter’s conspiracy-prone individual is likely to become ensconced in conspiracy
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theory after conspiracy theory, and to end up attached not to any particular, concrete
theory, but rather to an amorphous and all-consuming ‘conspiracy cloud’ that is defined
more by a way of thinking than by any particular points of content (Barkun, 1999, p.
249; Brugnoli et al, 2019; Taddicken and Wolff, 2020, pp. 1-2). With the presence of this
theme, we can see these processes of dissemination and cross-contamination happening
on /qresearch in real time.
Infighting
The final theme detailed here, Infighting, is also particularly striking, and such
conflicts are noteworthy for both their intense nature and for the frequency with which
they occur. Because of the self-assured and confrontational nature of many /qresearch
posters, and because the forum is the very place they go to seek reassurance and avoid
disconfirmation, disagreements rarely develop civilly. Rather, any point of dissonance
between the theory and reality, as well as any point of difference between posters, no
matter how small, is usually quick to devolve into a heated argument filled with expletive
name-calling, hate speech, and violent threats (James, 2000, p. 14). For example, Post
2.2.2.4, made in response to a post mocking /qresearch posters and QAnon as a whole:
“ever ask your self if youre willing to die for communism? this is a fucking joke to you
its a fucking game for money. this isnt a fucking game here, and youd shit yourself silly
if you ever really understood how deathly serious we are.” Clearly, some members of
/qresearch have no problem with threatening violence towards non-believers. This should
be kept in mind when considering QAnon as a political force and social phenomenon.
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In addition to the ubiquitous petty interpersonal grievances found on the board,
more substantial disagreements deal with topics like the content or validity of QAnon as
a theory, or the direction of the board and /qresearch community. For an example of this
latter type of internal controversy, we can look to Post 1.3.3.0, which laments: “shills
openly discussing gutting the board of everything that makes it /qresearch/ including the
flag.// And there it goes anons, they are taking the Q out of Q research.” As with the
mention of “shills” in the discussion of the Wildly Delusional theme above, what is
important to note here is that whatever the content, posters are united by a confrontational
and paranoiac discursive style (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17)
This degree and style of conflict among /qresearch posters is to be expected,
especially in the context of QAnon as a primarily internet-based iteration of conspiracy
theory community. Considering the confrontational and paranoid nature of conspiracy
theorists in general, and the aforementioned wide and varied spectrum of what QAnon
means to any given member of the community because of its amorphous online structure,
it is understandable that a high degree of conflict would ensue (Clarke, 2007, p. 175;
Craft, Ashley, and Maksl, 2017, pp. 1-2; James, 2000, p. 14). Further, and in conjunction
with certain other themes mentioned above (namely Optimism, Commitment, and Making
Excuses), engaging in these arguments on the side of Q and the Qmmunity serves to let
posters signal their commitment to the theory, and serves to discourage any poster that
does not wholeheartedly embrace the theory and community.
Also worth mentioning here is the observation that due to QAnon’s affiliation
with Trump and vaguely-defined conservative values, a strong reactionary thread, largely
in the form of explicit racism, homophobia, and misogyny, can be seen in many of the
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insults and threats included here. This is all the truer in light of /qresearch’s (and indeed,
QAnon’s) genesis on 4Chan, 8Chan, and 8Kun, online communities known in part for
their provocative ironic humor along these objectionable lines. This brand of ironic
discourse is also apparent when looking at certain cases of “Infighting” that are less
earnest confrontations, and more sarcastic insults from trolls. These two factors, of a
particularly hateful disposition towards marginalized groups and a unique irony
motivating a certain subset of /qresearch poster, are both essential aspects of QAnon that
any attempt to understand it along socio-cultural lines must engage with.
Findings
The theme profiles developed in the previous section are surely helpful in
describing to the reader the singular qualities of QAnon and the /qresearch community,
but for the purposes of this research project we must look further, towards a longitudinal
and comparative account of the dataset. Turning to a more comprehensive look at the
data as a whole offers us several insights into QAnon as a changing conspiracy theory
community, and especially one that must confront disproval at every turn as political
events have unfolded since the November 2020 US election. It is only by looking at the
thematic categories’ changing frequencies, and their relationship to one another, that a
real understanding of QAnon’s changing post-‘disproval’ trajectory can be gleaned. To
this end, a look at the table and graphs below is instructive:
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TABLE 1: Thematic Frequencies by Time Period
TIME
PERIOD
THEME

Pre-Election PostElection

Pre-January Post6
January 6

Post-Biden
Inauguration

Baking

40%

27%

16%

38%

22%

Irl Action

0%

0%

7%

0%

2%

Coupyearning

4%

13%

9%

5%

4%

Committed

16%

58%

42%

14%

20%

Optimistic

12%

17%

12%

8%

11%

Making
Excuses

4%

18%

5%

8%

9%

Pessimistic

0%

5%

2%

0%

2%

Wavering
Support

0%

2%

7%

5%

2%

Anti-Q

4%

12%

7%

0%

4%

Wildly
Delusional

29%

15%

7%

30%

26%

Conspiracy
Theory
Singularity

15%

8%

16%

30%

28%

Infighting

32%

37%

28%

11%

20%
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FIGURE 1: Themes Peaking Post-2020 Election

Themes Peaking Post-2020 Election
60%

Frequency

50%
40%
30%

Committed

20%

Making Excuses

10%

Optimistic

0%

Coup-yearning

Infighting

FIGURE 2: Themes Peaking Post-January 6th

Themes Peaking Post-January 6th
60%

Frequency

50%
40%
30%

Baking

20%
Wildly Delusional
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0%

Conspiracy Theory
Singularity
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FIGURE 3: Infrequently Occurring Themes

Infrequently Occurring Themes
60%

Frequency

50%
40%
30%
Irl Action

20%

Pessimistic

10%

Wavering Support

0%

Anti-Q

In parsing the data presented here, a few telling features immediately stand out.
Most strikingly, a series of three correlated groups, each following similar trends in
frequency and responding to the same key events, can be readily identified. First, in
Figure 1, we see a group of themes (Making Excuses, Coup-Yearning, Optimistic,
Committed, and Infighting), all of which peak in the second time period, following
Trump’s loss of the 2020 Election in November of that year. The themes then smoothly
decline and/or level out for the rest of the period studied. In particular, a strong
correlation can be seen between the former three themes, which all exhibit particularly
similar trajectories. The main difference between these three and Committed is that this
latter theme was so overwhelmingly present in the two time periods following the
election night. Indeed, the frequency of posts labelled Committed in the second time
period (58%) was far and away the highest value found in the dataset. The Infighting arc,
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on the other hand, is different in that it starts off relatively high, peaks with the rest after
the election, then declines with the rest before an uptick in the last recorded time period.
The second major correlate group, presented in Figure 2 includes the themes
Wildly Delusional, Conspiracy Theory Singularity, and Baking. These themes all exhibit
either a steady downward trend (as with Wildly Delusional and Baking) or a low ambient
rate of occurrence in the earlier time periods studies, before rising sharply to peak after
the January 6 Capitol riot. A levelling off or slight downward trend is then present in all
these themes following Biden’s January 20 inauguration.
Finally, the last group of themes (Pessimistic, Wavering Support, Anti-Q, and Irl
Action, depicted in Figure 3) is primarily noteworthy for their consistently low rates of
occurrence. Indeed, despite a general tendency to peak somewhere near the center of the
time period studied, only one of these themes (Anti-Q, 12%) was ever present in more
than 10% of posts in its highest showing.
With regards to these correlations, two time periods in particular seem to have
altered the thematic composition of discourse on /qresearch. We see one group (including
the themes Coup-Yearning, Making Excuses, Optimistic, Committed, and Infighting)
peaking during the post-election time period, and another (including the themes Wildly
Delusional, Conspiracy Theory Singularity, and Baking) peaking after the events of
January 6.
What, then, does this mean? What can we say about QAnon’s evolving post‘disproval’ trajectory on the basis of the trends and correlations identified here? What
conclusions can be drawn about the changing nature of QAnon as a conspiracy theory
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community? In order to answer these questions and set the stage for my comparative
analysis, I now present an interpretation of the data, grounded in the relevant literature on
conspiracy theories, group-based cognitive dissonance avoidance, and the internet’s
effects on these communities.
Interpretation
Before continuing any further, it is worthwhile to once again emphasize that the
discourse analysis performed here deals specifically with /qresearch, an 8Chan
messageboard. While this website is, as mentioned earlier, integral to the greater
conspiracy theory and a sort of home base for a group of hardcore Q supporters, it is not
supposed to be taken as representative of the whole. Rather, themes and trends discussed
here are relevant in that they denote changing discursive styles and patterns of use among
committed members of the greater Qmmunity. In interpreting and analysing these trends,
it is crucial to keep in mind that they are present not in QAnon as a whole, or at least not
in exactly or consistently the same way across other Q-focused fora, but rather in one key
site of hardcore theory- and community-building. My account of the data, and the
analysis to follow, relies on an understanding that /qresearch is but one significant part of
the greater QAnon community.
Reading into the key features of the data along the lines of the existing research
on the subject, a clear narrative based on certain key sites of continuity and change
emerges. At the beginning of the studied period, in the weeks preceding the 2020
election, QAnon exhibits characteristics very much resembling those of a classic
conspiracy theory community. We see a relatively high proportion of posts featuring

60

themes indicative of Hofstadter’s ‘paranoid personality,’ namely Wildly Delusional and
Conspiracy Theory Singularity (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 17). Further, we see a high
proportion of posts devoted to Baking and doing the ‘work’ of the theory. From this too
we can surmise a fairly niche online community of conspiracy theorists of the classic
type, devoting some degree of time and energy working to advancing their theory (Bader,
1999, p. 10).
As time goes on though, we see these characteristics, representative of the
‘paranoid personality’ typically associated with conspiracy theorists, exhibit a smooth
and steady decrease (As with Baking, which falls to 16%, and Wildly Delusional, which
falls to 7%) and/or remain relatively low (as with Conspiracy Theory Singularity, which
hovers around 16%) up until the crucial date of January 6. This fall in the prevalence of
themes indicative of a ‘paranoid personality’ suggests one of two possibilities: either the
hardened conspiracy theorists of /qresearch suddenly began losing their paranoid style,
or, much more likely, the board was inundated with a large group of new users, many of
whom were less overtly delusional, less ensconced in generalized conspiracy theory lore,
and less prone to commit their time and effort to the furthering of the specific web of
conspiracies associated with QAnon.
Indeed, at the same time as this decline is happening, we see a telling rise in
certain other themes, namely those associated with cognitive dissonance avoidance. In
particular, a marked increase in frequency of posts labelled Infighting, Optimistic,
Making Excuses, Coup-Yearning, and especially Committed coincides with Trump’s
electoral defeat in November of 2020. This rise is to be expected, as in Festinger,
Riecken, and Schachter’s (1956) classic model of increased and increasingly intense
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support for a theory among its followers after it is faced with disconfirmation. But, when
considered in tandem with the decreasingly paranoid style of discourse on the board, a
further insight can be made here. Specifically, this massive uptick in posts whose primary
function is to assuage feelings of discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance is the
result of an influx of recent converts to QAnon from the ranks of recently disappointed
Trump supporters.
In this reading of events many Trump supporters, faced with an unacceptable
contradiction of their worldview and expected reality in the form of Trump’s electoral
loss and presented with access to QAnon as a readily accessible community with the
potential to allay the psychic distress it engendered, began posting on /qresearch. These
new posters, paranoid and maladjusted as they may be, are not the typical denizens of
conspiracy theory communities described by Hofstadter (1964), hence the marked change
in discursive style. Rather, it is far more likely that they are distraught Trump supporters
of the more common variety, driven to QAnon in order to avoid coming to terms with an
unexpected affront to their beliefs and expectations. It is for this reason that we see the
decrease in themes denoting the classic paranoid style at the same time as a rise in those
representative of cognitive dissonance avoidance.
So, we can see that while Trump’s loss in the 2020 election is indeed the crucial
disconfirming event studied here, it is disconfirming to not one but two relevant groups:
extant QAnon followers and more mainstream Trump supporters. As would typically be
expected, the responses to this disconfirmation (in the form of posts categorized as
Infighting, Optimistic, Making Excuses, Coup-Yearning, and Committed) steadily taper
off in the following weeks and months. Tellingly, there is no commensurate spike in
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prevalence among these themes following the key date of January 6. This suggests that
/qresearch posters, recent converts and longtime hardcore conspiracy theorists alike, had
no expectation that the January 6 Capitol riot had any chance of toppling the government
and (re)installing Trump to power. So, the much-publicized events of January 6 are best
seen as closer to a tantrum-like display of public rage-venting by angry and insolent
Trump supporters than an attempt to seize state power by a hardened group of conspiracy
theorists. Even so, it is important to bear in mind that there were indeed violent political
extremists present at the Capitol on January 6th. While this particular episode was
certainly not a viable attempt at seizing state power, it certainly betrays a growing affinity
among the American right for mobilization along these troubling lines.
Another noteworthy and readily explained trend in the data is the rapid decline of
posts marked as Infighting following January 6. At only 11%, the frequency of disputes
on the board reached by far its lowest point during this period, falling dramatically from
the previous time periods. Here is a plain case of heightened group solidarity in the face
of conflict with outsiders as outlined by James (2000, p. 14)and others. The oftenbickering members of the /qresearch community, when faced with a galvanizing threat in
the form of near-universal condemnation by media, law enforcement, and society at
large, strengthened their commitment to one another and to the theory as a whole.
The final key change in discursive style also follows the events of January 6, as
we see a sudden sharp rise in those thematic categories (Wildly Delusional, Conspiracy
Theory Singularity, and Baking) associated with the committed behaviour associated with
the paranoid style of the hardcore conspiracy theorist. Here we can assume the presence
of two dynamics at play, the first of which has to do with the increasing costs associated
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with being affiliated with QAnon. Utilizing Iannoccone’s (in Bader, 1999) social choice
theory-based analytical framework, we can reasonably conjecture that whatever psychic
benefit participation in /qresearch offered in the form of cognitive dissonance avoidance
was at this point outweighed by the massive social sanction attached to QAnon believers
following the events of January 6, not to mention the very real possibility of legal
repercussions for those who may have participated in the storming of the Capitol. Still
though, we can assume that some portion of these recent converts did indeed develop
such a strong attachment to the theory that they were willing to incur the associated costs.
These followers, now thoroughly ensconced in the ‘cultic milieu’ of the QAnon theory
and /qresearch community, have taken on the paranoid style that is the hallmark of
hardened conspiracy theorists (Barkun, 1994, p. 249; Hofstadter, 1956, p. 17). For these
Americans, their encounter with conspiratorial thinking in the form of QAnon proved too
enticing and difficult to resist, and so they are likely to be wedded to some form of the
broader Q conspiracy theory for the foreseeable future.
Finally, it is important not to forget the four barely-prevalent themes, Pessimistic,
Anti-Q, Wavering Support, and Irl Action. Indeed, it is their very lack of occurrence in
the data that makes them of interest here. The former three themes, united in that they
denote an aberration from the baseline delusional optimism and support for Trump, Q,
and their associated movements, are expectedly low. This type of sentiment is
exceedingly rare among conspiracy theory communities, as they fail to serve a psychic
purpose. For the same reasons of cognitive dissonance avoidance discussed above,
disaffected members of the community are far more likely to leave and not be heard from
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again than they are to actually engage with the fact that they were wrong by speaking out
or asking questions.
The dearth of posts categorized under the last of these themes, Irl Action, is
noteworthy for another reason. Namely, it conveys the fact that the vast majority of
/qresearch posters, and indeed the vast majority of QAnon followers more generally, are
not committed enough to the theory to take meaningful and concerted political action in
its name beyond posting on internet message boards. The low barrier to entry into
conspiracy theory communities offered by the internet surely plays a part here, and can
be expected to have some effect on the development of conspiracy theories in online
settings. This intriguing thread will be developed more fully in the analysis to come.
So, at the end of the period studied, the discursive makeup of /qresearch is not so
different from where it was at the beginning: a relatively low baseline of cognitive
dissonance avoidance coupled with a relatively high degree of ambient paranoiac
behaviour and conspiracy theorizing. This balance was briefly upset by the introduction
of zealously committed Trump supporters following his electoral loss in November 2020,
but once these fairweather conspiracy theorists either left in the face of rising costs to
engagement with the theory or were inculcated into conspiracy theory thinking and so
changed their discursive style, the /qresearch messageboard returned to form.
Suffice to say, QAnon’s trajectory in the months between November 2020 and
January 2021 is an interesting and convoluted one. But while this account is surely of
great analytic value, merely sketching the evolution of QAnon and the /qresearch board is
insufficient. The goal here is to gain insight into the ways in which QAnon’s post-
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‘disproval’ trajectory has been altered by its reliance on the internet. So, with these key
insights established, this research project now turns to its final analysis of QAnon as an
internet-based conspiracy theory community.
ANALYSIS
It is clear that QAnon’s position at the confluence of two key forces, the internet
and the MAGA movement, defined the theory’s existence and evolution between
November 2020 and January 2021. As an observation of the data shows, the pathway
taken by QAnon over this period is familiar in some ways, and new in others. By virtue
of its unique medium- and content-based context, only an account drawing on insights
from a combination of disciplines and contextual areas of focus can deliver a
comprehensive understanding of the internet’s effects on QAnon as a resilient conspiracy
theory community. It is to this task that this work now turns, starting with a discussion of
the ways in which QAnon’s overwhelmingly online nature affected its nature as a theory
and community.
Based on the interpretation of findings presented above, we can see that the
internet had varied and far-reaching effects on QAnon’s evolution throughout the period
spanning late 2020 and early 2021. Firstly and perhaps most crucially, the internet’s
unique character as a medium served to allow for the wide and rapid distribution of the
theory. Without this quality, it is unlikely that QAnon would have been able to make
itself known and accessible to such a large audience in such a short time. This stands in
alignment with existing research, which generally maintains that the internet’s primary
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effect on conspiracy theories is to hasten their spread (Craft, Ashley, and Maksl, 2017;
Hickle, 2018)
Another key quality of QAnon flowing from its presence on the internet can be
seen in the theory’s responsive and individualized nature. The interactive baking
mechanism central to QAnon harnesses the power of the internet in order to let followers
participate in the interactive creation of their own personalized conspiracy theory
narrative. This almost-gamified quality serves to make the theory even more attractive to
would-be adherents, in part by giving each a bespoke theory package to suit their
individual predispositions, and thus likely results in a higher rate of membership growth.
Also at play here is a dynamic that can be readily noticed in Post 5.1.2.0 about where the
“Q team need us [/qresearch posters] to be,” referenced in the earlier discussion of the
Making Excuses theme. Namely, the feeling of agency that this interactive aspect affords
users, as /qresearch posters seem to be invested in the idea that by baking, spreading the
good word, and otherwise developing the theory, they themselves are an integral part of
‘Team Q.’ So, by virtue of its basis on the internet, QAnon offers users the best of both
worlds- they get to be active participants in a righteous struggle, all from the comfort of
their couches. Indeed, we can accurately say that a significant part of QAnon’s appeal
comes from its game-like qualities – the Qmmunity is in many ways as similar to a
massive multiplayer online game as it is to a cult, though outside observers and critics
have understandably more often fallen back on the latter metaphor in attempting to
explain the theory’s spread, appeal, and structure.
The striking amount of discussion of non-Q conspiracy theories (as captured by
the theme Conspiracy Theory Singularity) is also suggestive when considered along these
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lines. Because the internet facilitates the blurring of borders between communities like no
medium before, it leads to cross-contamination among conspiracy theorists who
otherwise would never have come into contact with one another’s ideas (Castells, 1997,
pp. 95-96; Edy and Risley-Baird, 2016, p. 13; James, 2000, p. 14). By easily entrapping
new converts in borderless communities filled with conspiracy theorists of varying types
and degrees of intensity, the online medium facilitates inculcation into the ranks of
conspiracy theorists like no other. This boundary-blurring tendency, in combination with
the interactive quality discussed above, has produced a generalizing effect among
conspiracy theorists. Rather than seeing groups with well-defined and communally-held
conspiratorial beliefs, we now see an amorphous and atomized ‘conspiracy cloud’
populated by individuals, each of whom holds their own unique combination of
idiosyncratic beliefs.
The above-established dynamic of the internet’s convenience-based effects has
had another important effect on QAnon’s trajectory. By lowering the bar for
participation, the internet allowed for the rapid growth the board experienced after
Trump’s 2020 electoral loss, but also for the rapid exodus of these very same adherents
following the January 6 Capitol riot. This is easily understood from the perspective of a
conspiracy theorist-specific iteration of social choice theory (Bader, 1999). In short, the
psychic benefit offered to these frustrated Trump supporters in the form of easily
accessed cognitive dissonance avoidance far outweighed the minimal costs of logging
onto /qresearch. In the past, engagement with a conspiracy theory community
necessitated the incursion of some significant costs (sacrificing time to leave home and
go to meetings, the social sanction of being seen in public with a fringe group, providing
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personal information to join mailing lists, and so on) and so required a relatively high
degree of commitment (Bader, 1999). The internet has significantly altered this dynamic
and effectively lowered the barriers to participation, with the effect of dramatically
increasing the number of prospective conspiracy theorists.
Simultaneously though, and by virtue of this same low barrier to entry in the form
of QAnon’s near-exclusive basis on the internet, we see that this wave of new converts
are not as committed to the theory as the average denizens of earlier conspiracy theory
communities (Bader, 1999, p. 12). Thus they are both less likely to participate in theorybuilding and community-developing acts like baking, and more likely to leave the theory
at the first sign of trouble or increased perceived cost to themselves. We can say then that
while the internet allows for the rapid introduction of new members to a conspiracy
theory community, it also makes for fickle followers.
Clearly the internet has had an undeniable effect on QAnon, both in its form and
structure as a theory and as an evolving conspiracy theory community. From here we can
reasonably make the important assumption that future conspiracy theories will be
similarly impacted by the barrier-lowering, interactive, and boundary-blurring qualities of
the internet that have been identified here. But it is important not to overstate the
influence of the internet on QAnon’s trajectory, as there are important contextual
particularities that have caused this theory to follow the distinct route it did. Specifically,
QAnon’s inextricable connection to Donald Trump’s singular political project and
fortunes played a major role in determining the theory’s post-‘disproval’ trajectory.
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Throughout the run-up to the 2016 election, a Trump Presidency served as an
impossible fantasy to an increasingly large portion of aggrieved right-wing Americans.
To many, support for Trump and the MAGA project became symbolic of membership in
one side of an increasingly intense culture war. Following his surprise victory and rise to
the White House, Trump’s outsized place in the cultural and political imagination of
many supporters was only further cemented, and went on to dominate the next four years
of political discourse and ever-heightening culture war. In this way, the singular
conditions of the Trump Presidency and MAGA movement led to the creation of a
committed political community with a disconfirmable focal point in the form of one man
and his political fortunes. With a huge chunk of the population’s visceral psychic energy
tied to Trump, his failure was primed to have profound, widespread, and politicallyrelevant effects.
With the stage thus set, we see in the post-election Trump base the textbook
conditions of Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s (1956, p. 10) classic dissonanceavoidant community: a group with a shared, deeply-held, and recognizably falsifiable
belief. QAnon, with its inextricable connection to Trump and ready-made explanation for
and denial of his loss, presented itself as attractive to a huge subset of the population
looking to assuage their discomfort by denying reality. Though these new converts are
undoubtedly delusional and unstable to some significant degree, they are largely not yet
conspiracy theorists of the hardened and committed variety, and many stand to leave their
newfound community when confronted with meaningful costs. But, as mentioned above,
an increasing proportion of this new wave of converts, encouraged in part by the uniquely
enticing ‘cultic milieu’ of QAnon as an online, and thus interactive, personalized, and
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low-cost conspiracy theory narrative, are sure to be drawn in more fully and become
committed long-term conspiracy theorists (Barkun, 1994, p. 249; Brugnoli, et al, 2019;
Taddicken and Wolff, 2020)
So, it is clear that QAnon does in fact owe much of its trajectory to its nature as a
near-wholly internet-based conspiracy theory. In particular, its borderless, widespread,
easily accessible, and enticing interactive qualities all served to make it different in key
regards from older conspiracy theories and conspiracy theory communities. Even so,
these effects are not so transformative as to fully change the classic characteristics of
conspiracy theory communities. Hofstader’s (1964, p. 17) paranoid personality is still
readily identifiable among /qresearch posters, and the theory still serves the same
alienation-addressing purpose seen in conspiracy theories of all stripes (Gramsci, 2000 in
Marcovic, 2018, pp. 9-11; Groh, 1987; Harding and Stweart, 2003, pp. 263-264). Longidentified models of analysis based on cognitive dissonance avoidance and contextdependent cost-benefit considerations are still readily applicable to QAnon. Much has
changed with the introduction of the internet as a medium for the dissemination of
conspiracy theories, but even more has stayed the same.
We can further say that although QAnon’s basis in the internet has caused some
important stylistic differences to arise, and mutated some existing structural
characteristics key to its development, the theory remains fundamentally similar to
historical conspiracies across almost every measurable dimension. Strange as it is,
QAnon does not represent a meaningful departure from the long line of conspiracy
theories in American political history, and indeed in some ways it gives new life to
existing conspiracy theories by bringing them into conversation with one another in new
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ways. As comforting as it may be to some to write off this bizarre and disturbing
conspiracy theory, and indeed the entire Trump Presidency around which it is based, as
an aberration from the norm, this is emphatically not the case. Anything more than a
cursory glance at American history will show that politics and the theories and forces
surrounding it have always been this surreal and ludicrous. Hofstadter’s (in Hellinger,
2003, p. 202) observation that conspiracy theories are catalyzed by widespread belief that
“popular sovereignty and republican principles are threatened by concentrated economic
power” both domestically and abroad is certainly worth considering at this particular
moment in history. If he was correct in making this observation, it is likely that QAnon
will be around for some time, and that it may well seem bland and uninspired compared
to what comes next.
CONCLUSION
Through the use of a longitudinal discourse analysis of posts on the /qresearch
messageboard, this research attempted to answer the question: How has QAnon’s
structure, style, and content evolved in the face of increasing ‘disproval,’ and what does
QAnon’s post-‘disproval’ trajectory tell us about the internet’s effects on conspiracy
theories? In doing so, it yielded a number of important insights into the important and
intriguing phenomena of QAnon in particular and internet-based conspiracy theories in
general. Further, in developing a novel case study analysis of cognitive dissonance
avoidance-seeking communities in an online setting, this work offers a timely update to
the literature dealing with dissonance avoidance, and opens the door to future research
along these lines. These meaningful contributions notwithstanding, this work is, at most,
a meagre contribution to the vast literature on a complex topic. Indeed, in pursuing my
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analysis a number of analytic gaps and avenues for future research presented themselves,
highlighting the understudied nature of this pressingly important topic.
The conclusions drawn from this research are especially valuable given QAnon’s
obvious political aspirations and the looming threat of further violent political action. In
particular, my findings that the QAnon community in its current form does not in and of
itself represent a particularly committed, united, or capable political movement, and that
it is not at its core very different from the dozens of extant conspiracy theory
communities that populate the fringes of American civil society should be of some
comfort, as they suggest that this group is not likely to seek a more complete and less
farcical repeat of the January 6 riot that so shocked the world. Even so, it is unnerving to
know that even a small subset of the population earnestly believes in the theory described
here. It is further worrying that thousands of Americans were willing to engage in an
illegal and violent political demonstration, at significant risk to their own time, effort,
safety, and freedom, all in the name of a distressingly nonsensical and overtly
antidemocratic conspiracy theory associated with a reactionary political movement.
Simultaneously though, in seeking to understand the ways in which QAnon’s
internet-based nature affected its trajectory, the research shed light on the mechanisms
underlying conspiracy theories and the communities that surround them. The conclusions
drawn in this regard are of even greater import, as they promise to inform our
understanding of future conspiracy theories, their associated communities, and their post‘disproval’ trajectories. Indeed my findings, that the internet acts to a) rapidly spread
conspiracy theories, b) significantly lower the costs of participating in such theories c)
add to them an interactive element, and d) blur the boundaries between conspiracy theory
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communities of differing focus, all promise to be of use in future analyses of internetbased conspiracy theories.
While some of the conclusions drawn about QAnon in particular might be
surprisingly optimistic, the same can not be said of the implications of these broader
findings. Perhaps most pressingly, it is worrying that a bizarre group-based delusional
behaviour pattern, once observed among a UFO cult and typically applied to other such
fringe communities, can now be seen on display among a not insignificant portion of the
American electorate. The internet is not going anywhere, and neither are the profound
alienation and resultant divisive culture wars that led to both the Trump Presidency and
the rise of QAnon. This same combination of social forces and technological
development that resulted in QAnon’s rise is still present and promises to engender
increasingly forceful support for increasingly nonsensical theories. Indeed, the recent
wave of anti-vax and anti-mandate protests across North America and the West more
generally shows clearly that this phenomenon, of rightwing-motivated and
conspiratorially-tinged mass political mobilization, is here to stay. It is for this primary
reason that the importance of studying these forces cannot be overstated, and that further
research along the lines of the work presented here is warranted.
That said, this MRP research is at best a small contribution to the body of existing
scholarship dealing with conspiracy theories and the internet’s effects on them. As a
result of my chosen methodology, as well as certain constraints placed on this work by its
nature as a graduate research project, this research is limited in a few noteworthy ways
which warrant mention here. Firstly, a larger-scale discourse analysis with a larger
sample size and a more quantitative focus would, among other things, be better able to
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demonstrate the conversion/exodus dynamic identified here, and so would be particularly
useful to the study of conspiracy theory communities’ trajectories. Second, a study
similar in nature to the one pursued here, but spanning several mediums or at least several
boards, would be better placed to make generalizations about QAnon’s stylistic attributes.
While I believe that /qresearch is particularly useful to analyze for the reasons outlined in
the methodology, it is likely not reflective of the Qmmunity as a whole, as some
supporters of the theory might post exclusively on certain sites, and these posters might
exhibit differing characteristics or the same characteristics to differing degrees. Finally, a
comparative discourse analysis focused on examining QAnon in direct contrast to a
comparable but non-online conspiracy theory would also be exceptionally well-placed to
confirm the findings of this research, as well as to further develop knowledge of the
internet’s effects on conspiracy theories’ post-‘disproval’ trajectories. In particular, a
more in-depth examination of the generalizing and border-blurring effect identified here,
comparing the degree of “Conspiracy theory singularity”-style posts among online and
non-online conspiracy theory communities, would be instructive.
These limitations notwithstanding, this research represents a meaningful step
forward for the study of the internet’s effects on conspiracy theories and their post‘disproval’ trajectories, and promises to add significant knowledge to this captivating and
important area of study. Indeed, in light of increasing disaffection with Western liberal
democratic capitalism and a connected crisis of democracy in many of the core countries
of the West, the role of conspiracy theories and related political forces is rising
precipitously. Sociopolitical communities and movements often derided as “fringe” or
“extremist” are increasingly taking center stage in Western political culture, a trend
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which is sure to continue without a dramatic change in governance as well as
socioeconomic conditions and organization. With this in mind, we can make the
unfortunate but sound observation that although QAnon may have been the first
conspiracy theory in some time to have had such visible effects on American politics, it
will surely not be the last.
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